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Chapter 1
General Introduction
1.1 Research Motivation
Individuals face many exogenous shocks during their working life with direct consequences
for the volatility of their income streams. Events such as unemployment, sickness and child
birth can have a substantial impact on the wage profile of an individual. In general, welfare
states are designed to cushion against these shocks.
The income gaps, which may arise due to job loss, are bridged with help of the German
unemployment insurance system. In this system, the unemployment benefits, which are paid
to the unemployed in a given year, are financed by the employed, who pay an obligatory tax
rate on their wage income. As the employed pay taxes without knowing whether they will
ever benefit themselves from this system, and unemployed can receive money without ever
internalizing the cost they produce, the incentives to work of both groups of individuals
are therefore considerably affected. The current design of the German UI system therefore
raises the question whether the system allows to generate sufficient incentives to work or
whether alternative designs may offer the same benefits without creating these distortions.
Alternative designs of unemployment insurance systems could provide a solid foundation
for triggering stronger working incentives. The unemployment account system e.g., explic-
itly aims at improving those incentives by strengthening the link between contributions
and withdrawals. In the unemployment account system, employed individuals pay a cer-
tain contribution (as percentage of their wage) to their individual unemployment account.
When unemployed, individuals are allowed to withdraw their unemployment benefits from
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their individual accounts. Anything that is left over upon retirement can then be used to
top up pension income. Through this final payout upon retirement individuals explicitly
benefit from not using their accounts. Thus, they gain additional incentives for remaining
employed or for leaving unemployment as soon as possible. Therefore, the main advantage
of this system is that it creates more transparency with respect to the actual cost that
unemployment imposes on the society. In the account system the unemployed internalize
more of these costs than in the current design of the traditional German unemployment
insurance system. In this way, the unemployment account system promises to maintain the
redistributive power to reduce income instability without distorting the incentives to work.
The success of implementing such an unemployment account system in Germany rests
heavily on the underlying structure of the present tax-transfer system. In detail, one needs
to ensure that the unemployment account system builds on a basic, solid foundation, in
which the share of unemployment benefits that are self-financed throughout the life cycle
of anindividual is relatively high. This income redistribution which takes place within the
life cycle of one individual is called intrapersonal income redistribution.
Such a high extent of intrapersonal income redistribution in Germany is likely to ensure
the functioning of a system of unemployment accounts, which is explicitly designed to
facilitate the transfer of income over time to finance periods of unemployment.
This empirical foundation (which identifies the extent of the German intrapersonal re-
distribution) has not yet been established for Germany.
1.2 Research Objectives and Main Results
The major goal of this thesis is to explore the potential impact of an unemployment account
system on individuals’ employment incentives. This thesis consists of three parts. In the first
part (Chapter 2) we identify the extent of the intrapersonal income redistribution, which is
inherent in the German tax-benefit system. In order to facilitate this analysis we generate
lifetime data (on income, taxes and transfers) by matching homogenous groups of individuals
belonging to different age cohorts. We find that measuring the redistributive effect of the
public tax-transfer system with annual data appears to overestimate the redistribution that
actually occurs across individuals. Most of the transfers are less redistributive in a lifetime
perspective than in the annual perspective. This implies that a substantial fraction of the
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transfers is actually financed by the taxes of the same individual at some point during his
life.
In order to identify the exact extent of self-financed transfers we disentangle the inter-
personal from the intrapersonal income redistribution. In other words, we calculate which
part of the German redistribution serves to reduce inequality across individuals (from the
lifetime rich to the lifetime poor) vs which part helps to smooth consumption over the life
cycle by redistributing income within the life cycle of one and the same individual. Disen-
tangling the income redistribution in this way shows that the extent of intrapersonal income
redistribution in Germany is indeed very high.
Moreover, we find that the extent of the German intrapersonal income redistribution is
also sensitive to the different kinds of taxes which are included in the calculations. These
results apply to a combination of transfers which are received by the average German house-
hold. Detailing our analysis further, we calculate the intrapersonal income redistribution
associated with selected transfers. Our results show that the extent of self-financing differs
enormously with respect to the specific transfer in question. In particular, unemployment
benefits exhibit a large share of redistribution that occurs within the life cycle of one indi-
vidual.
A high extent of intrapersonal income redistribution is a prerequisite for a well-functioning
accounts system. As in particular German unemployment benefits are to a large extent self-
financed, which suggests a high potential for the introduction of unemployment accounts. In
Chapter 3 we therefore turn to the implementation of the unemployment account system.
In particular, we are investigating whether replacing the traditional German unemploy-
ment insurance system by unemployment accounts will improve employment incentives and
thereby also the overall unemployment rate.
We employ a stochastic life-cycle framework to study how the trade-off between labor
market incentives, consumption and savings is affected under a system of unemployment
accounts.
In the account system individuals internalize the cost of their unemployment, and expect
to receive a payout upon retirement. This induces changes in their behavior and strengthens
employment incentives. As a consequence we find that the unemployment rate falls for all
age groups. The account system proves to be particularly efficient at reducing old-age
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unemployment. In order to further stimulate the employment incentives of the younger
generations, we introduce multiple payout periods. It turns out, that once those multiple
payouts during the working life are implemented, the employment incentives are indeed
amplified even further.
Our dynamic optimization model also allows us to analyze the welfare implications of
unemployment accounts. From the individuals’ point of view, a reduced leisure choice may
be welfare decreasing as leisure is part of individuals’ utility. However, our results show
that labour market entrants expect higher welfare under the UA system than under the UI
system. This holds in particular for poor individuals, who accordingly experience a larger
welfare gain under the UA system.
Finally, looking at the unemployment account system from a financial perspective, we
see that the account system is superior to the UI system. The government budget improves
even with multiple payout periods.
In Chapter 4 we stress the role of the financial perspective and determine the optimal
tax rate both in the long-run and during a transition period. Our first goal in this chapter
is to implement a pay-as-you-go structure in the unemployment account system with a
balanced government budget and identify the optimal long-run tax rate. Moreover, we
investigate how the incentives and the unemployment rate behave in the long-run and how
they react to the adjusted tax rate, which prevails in the long-run. We find that the optimal
tax rate is lower when the tax rate is adjusted to achieve a balanced budget (with PAYG
account structure) in the long-run. In consequence, this raises the employment incentives
in the aggregate. Furthermore, our results highlight the importance of analyzing individual
behavioral patterns, as the tax cut reduces the incentives to work for certain groups of
individuals. Overall, however, the long-run unemployment rate is reduced when compared
with the UI situation.
Our second goal is to identify the optimal tax rate during the transition period when
switching from the UI system to the UA system. The optimal tax rate is not constant,
but decreasing during the transition period. In the first years of the transition period
the tax rate which balances the budget is comparatively high. Nevertheless, even right
after the switch from the UI to the UA system there are enough employment incentives
generated, such that it is financially feasible to introduce the accounts. After a relatively
4
high tax rate in the first years, the tax rate then drops and is much lower than in the UI
system. When evaluating the welfare implications during the transition period, we find
that the vast majority of the individuals experiences large welfare gains in each year of the
transition period when switching to the account system.
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Chapter 2
Synthetic Life Cycles and Intrapersonal Income
Redistribution in Germany
2.1 Introduction
The welfare state performs two main functions through the tax-benefit system: The first
function is the interpersonal redistribution of income from the rich to the poor. The sec-
ond function is the intrapersonal redistribution of income within the individual’s lifetime.
Reallocating resources from rich to poor individuals is meant to reduce income inequality
between these individuals, while intrapersonal income redistribution refers to the fact that
a large part of the taxes, which finances transfers, is actually channelled back to the individ-
ual at a different point in his life. Reallocating resources within the lifetime of individuals
acts as an insurance mechanism to facilitate consumption smoothing over the life cycle.
It mitigates income shocks arising for example due to unemployment, child birth and ill
health.
Fennel and Stark (2005) assert that the interpersonal income redistribution is based on
normative judgements, while the intrapersonal income redistribution responds to shortcom-
ings in the life-cycle hypothesis arising from imperfect consumption smoothing. According
to Fennel and Stark (2005) there are several barriers to perfect consumption smoothing
over the life cycle. Uncertainty over future income earnings serves as one barrier, but also
borrowing constraints, and illiquidity issues impede individuals from perfect consumption
smoothing. Furthermore, Fennel and Stark (2005) point out that since people consume as
part of their household and not individually, this might eventually be reflected by their
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lifetime consumption pattern. Finally, Fennel and Stark (2005) argue that behavioral as-
pects, such as self-control problems of the individual, habit formation and other preferences
relating to the evolution of consumption patterns have a strong impact on the consumption
decision of the individual.
Thus, intrapersonal income redistribution stabilizes consumption patterns over time
and consequently may attribute to reducing income inequality over the life cycle of the
individuals. Yet in the case of Germany, so far only few studies have dealt with the extent
of the German intrapersonal income redistribution. Instead, most of the literature focuses on
the overall redistributional impact of the tax-benefit system. This is commonly measured
by comparing the income inequality of the pre- and post-fiscal income 1. OECD (2012)
reports a Gini coefficient of 0.42 for the German pre-fiscal income of the working population
in the late 2000s compared to 0.3 for the post-fiscal income. The reduction of the Gini
coefficient shows that in Germany income inequality is reduced considerably via taxes and
transfers. However, measuring the redistributional impact by comparing the pre- and post-
fiscal income at a single point in time is problematic for several reasons. One problem is the
counterfactual. In order to analyze the extent of the redistributive effect of the tax-benefit
system, one would ideally need to compare the post-fiscal income to a situation in which
the state does not engage in redistribution, instead of simply using the pre-fiscal income.
The mere existence of the tax-benefit system will influence the individuals’ labour market
behavior, such as entering or leaving the labor market and the choice of working hours.
Therefore, pre-fiscal income is not equivalent to the hypothetical income earned when no
government intervention follows. However, a situation without government intervention is
clearly unobservable and therefore cannot serve as a point of reference. Instead, we follow
the standard approach in the literature and use pre-fiscal income as the point of reference.
Another more important drawback of relying on annual income inequality is the focus
on one function of the welfare state: the redistribution from rich to poor individuals. Using
a single point in time - usually a year - is misleading as it overestimates this interpersonal
redistribution. According to ter Rele (2007), data in one single year represent just a snapshot
1The Gini coefficient is one popular measure of income inequality. It ranges between 0 and 1, with higher
values implying more income inequality. A value of 1 implies that one person owns all income, while others
own nothing.
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of the income distribution prevalent in the population and does not take into account that
the earnings profile of an individual is not constant over the lifetime.
A young student may be poor early in life, but he may enjoy a relatively high income
later in life. In a lifetime perspective this student will appear much richer than in a single
year at the beginning of his working life. The same reasoning holds for pensioners, who
may appear more poor in an annual perspective than in a lifetime perspective. The extent
of intrapersonal redistribution, or the income smoothing that is observed over a lifetime is
completely ignored.
Using lifetime income data instead of annual data takes into account that the tax-transfer
system induces individuals to shift income over time. Therefore, lifetime income is expected
to be much more equally distributed than annual income2. Sandmo (1999) argues along
the same lines claiming that the redistributional effect of the tax-benefit system tends to
be overstated, since much of it would arise from income smoothing, which can be thought
of as really a substitute for private saving and insurance.
The purpose of this chapter is to disentangle the German income redistribution that
takes place within the life cycle from the redistribution that takes place from the lifetime
rich to the lifetime poor. As we have argued before, a large share of intrapersonal income
redistribution can provide a fertile soil for the effectiveness of unemployment accounts on
labor market incentives. As no historical data on German taxes and transfers are available
that cover the entire lifetime of individuals, we generate synthetic life cycles to infer lifetime
income data.
Our results suggest that the German lifetime income is indeed more evenly distributed
than annual incomes. Consequently, annual data on German income tend to overestimate
the redistributive impact of the tax-benefit system, as a large share actually occurs within
the life cycle of an individual. Moreover, we also find that next to the income which is
redistributed via the public tax-benefit system, a large part of the redistribution takes
place within households. In fact, households income redistribution reduces lifetime income
inequality almost to the same extent as the public tax-benefit system does.
Next, we calculate the extent of the intrapersonal income redistribution for Germany,
2See e.g. O’Donoghue (2001) for an extensive analysis of the effect of the length of the accounting period
for the income redistribution analysis.
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by using our generated lifetime data on taxes and transfers. Our estimations show that
almost two thirds of all transfers received by the average German over the life-cycle are
self-financed. This share of self-financed transfers rises over the income distribution. These
results refer to a broad combination of the main transfers received by the average German
household 3.
Decomposing the intrapersonal redistribution further shows, that the extent of the in-
trapersonal income redistribution differs enormously across transfers. We calculate the
intrapersonal redistribution for selected transfers and find that the intrapersonal income
redistribution is particularly high in the case of unemployment benefits, while the average
share of self-financed transfers is much lower for e.g. maternity benefits. Furthermore, the
analysis reveals that the share of self-financed unemployment benefits is remarkably high in
all income deciles.
Finally, we show that the extent of the intrapersonal income redistribution is also sen-
sitive to the kind of taxes which are included in the model. In the German case, we find
that using indirect taxes in addition to direct taxes raises the intrapersonal redistribution
even further (about 10 percentage points).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the literature
with respect to the methodology and the results on the intrapersonal income redistribution.
Section 2.3 presents our approach to modeling synthetic life cycles. In Section 2.4 we
analyze the synthetic life-cycle data. Section 2.5 computes the intrapersonal redistribution
of income and Section 2.6 concludes our analysis.
2.2 Previous Studies on Intrapersonal Redistribution
Only few studies have dealt with the intrapersonal and the interpersonal elements of the
transfers and taxes in the German welfare state. Bartels (2012) distinguishes the German
inter-individual income inequality from the intra-individual income inequality of West Ger-
man households over a 20 year period and finds that the majority of the reduction in long-
term income inequality can be attributed to income smoothing (via insurance) as opposed
3with the exception of old-age pensions
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to inter-individual redistribution. This points to a comparatively high share of interpersonal
income redistribution. Another study related to this context focuses on the intragenera-
tional and intergenerational components of the German welfare system 4. Several studies
have attempted to calculate the intrapersonal and interpersonal income redistribution for
some countries, other than Germany. Table 2.1 provides a brief summary of those studies.
In general, the share of the intrapersonal redistribution is quite high across those countries,
which indicates that a substantial share of the income redistribution takes place within a
taxpayer’s own life cycle, as opposed to between taxpayers.
Country Intra Inter Source Year Sample Size
Australia 38 (52) 62 (48) Falkingham and Harding (1996) 1986 4000
Britain 62 (71) 38 (29) Falkingham and Harding (1996) 1985 4000
Denmark 74 26 Sorensen et al. (2006) 1994-2002 10% of 18+ pop.
Ireland 55 45 O’Donoghue (2001) 1994 4048
Italy 77 23 Baldini (2001) 1991 & 1993 4000
Sweden 82 18 Pettersson and Pettersson (2003) 1999 112 000
Table 2.1: Related Literature on Intrapersonal Income Redistribution.
Inter(Intra) refers to the inter- (intra)personal income redistribution. For Australia and
Britain, the values in brackets denote the intra- and interpersonal income redistribution
levels using also indirect taxes as opposed to only direct taxes.
However, the share of the intrapersonal income redistribution varies largely between coun-
tries, from 38% in Australia to 82 % in Sweden. This large range must not always purely
reflect differences between countries but might actually, at least partly occur due to the
different underlying methods applied to compute the intrapersonal redistribution. These
methods vary due to differences in 1) modeling lifetime data, 2) transfers, 3) taxes allocated
to finance transfers, 4) the base year of the data and 5) the nature of the welfare states.
In the following, we provide a more detailed description of the methodological differences
between different studies.
Differences in Modeling Lifetime Data
There are different approaches to modeling lifetime data when historical data are unavail-
4Bo¨rsch-Supan and Reil-Held (2001) identify the intragenerational vs intergenerational transfer share which
is inherent in the German pension system.
10
able. Estimates on intrapersonal redistribution varying across countries may therefore be
the result of inherent differences in the models which are used to generate lifetime data.
One method to generate lifetime data is to create dynamic microsimulation models, us-
ing either cohorts of individuals or an entire population. Dynamic cohort microsimulation
models e.g. simulate the personal characteristics and the behavior of a cohort of individuals.
In order to capture the idiosyncrasy of life cycles, these models account for major events
during an individual’s life cycle. The set of these events encompasses e.g. educational train-
ing, marriage, divorce, parenthood, labor market participation, retirement and death. The
events that are simulated differ in every model and the transitional probabilities that life-
time events occur are based on cross-sectional data in one specific base year. Usually these
probabilities depend on the age of the individuals. Furthermore, cohort models assume a
steady-state world, in which the economic environment of the base year prevails during the
entire lifetime. Prominent dynamic cohort models are HARDING for Australia by Falking-
ham and Lessof (1991) and LIFEMOD for Great Britain by Harding (1993). Falkingham
and Harding (1996) use these models to evaluate the redistributive effect of the tax-benefit
system with regard to annual and simulated lifetime data in both countries. They disen-
tangle the intrapersonal redistribution from the interpersonal redistribution and find that it
amounts to 38% - 51% in Australia and 62%-71% in Britain, depending on the underlying
financing of the transfers. O’Donoghue (2001) applies a dynamic cohort microsimulation
model to Ireland and finds an intrapersonal redistribution of 54%.
However, dynamic cohort microsimulation models have several disadvantages. Accord-
ing to OECD (2007), one such disadvantage arises from the static data which leads to a
weak behavioral component of the data set. Another disadvantage of dynamic cohort mi-
crosimulation models are the costly requirement of using large data and potential problems
of validating the simulation results.
An alternative method that circumvents some of these problems is applied in Sorensen
et al. (2006) for Denmark. Their approach is to generate synthetic life cycles by matching
homogenous individuals from different age cohorts. Sorensen et al. (2006) do not use a
dynamic microsimulation model that ages a certain cohort but instead links panel data of
different age cohorts together. The resulting intrapersonal income redistribution that is
attributed to the Danish tax-benefit system is 74%. In addition, Sorensen et al. (2006)
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also distinguish the intrapersonal income redistribution that takes place within a given year
from the intrapersonal income redistribution that takes place in other years of the life cycle.
Overall, Sorensen et al. (2006) find that most self-financing of Danish transfers occurs within
a given year.
We assert that the method by Sorensen et al. (2006) of generating synthetic life cycles is
most appropriate for our analysis, because of the dynamic components of income, transfers
and taxes. In particular, the analysis of intrapersonal income redistribution will benefit
from the behavioral component, which - to a certain degree - is represented by intervals
of real-world data in the synthetic life cycle. A detailed description of our methodology is
presented in Section 2.3.
Differences in Transfers
The estimates on intrapersonal redistribution in Table 2.1 may also vary because different
transfer types are included in the analyses. Pettersson and Pettersson (2003) e.g. distin-
guish between intrapersonal redistribution with and without old-age pensions and find that
including old-age pensions raises the intrapersonal redistribution from 68% to 77%.
Another source of potential divergence is the private use of public subsidies (or non-cash
benefits), which is excluded by most studies. One exception is Pettersson and Pettersson
(2003), who explicitly model publicly financed private consumption5. They incorporate
an extensive list of public subsidies, such as various types of education, care of relatives
(children and the elderly), labor market activities and health care services and argue that
supplementing the disposable income with these public subsidies is a better way to approxi-
mate individual utility. The resulting intrapersonal redistribution amounts to 82%. Similar
to Sorensen et al. (2006), Pettersson and Pettersson (2003) also distinguish between the
intrapersonal redistribution within a given year, and the one within other years of the the
individuals’ life cycle. They conclude that, when disentangling the intrapersonal redistri-
bution this way, more than half of it actually occurs within a given year. According to
Pettersson and Pettersson (2003), a large fraction of the intrapersonal redistribution within
a given year occurs because most of the Swedish transfers are subject to income tax.
5The value of the subsidy is assumed to equal production costs net of fees.
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Differences in Taxes Allocated to Finance the Transfers
In order to isolate the extent of a tax payer’s share of self-financed transfers, it is necessary
to correctly identify that part of the taxes, which is used to finance the transfers. In gen-
eral, most models include different variants of the personal income tax and social insurance
contributions. One additional difference may arise when indirect taxes are included in the
analyses. According to O’Donoghue et al. (2004), in most countries indirect taxes are re-
gressive or at least income-neutral with respect to disposable income, whereas the income
tax is progressive. The decision to include progressive or regressive taxes will affect the
results on the extent of the intrapersonal redistribution. Using both, direct and indirect
taxes (as opposed to only direct taxes) should raise the amount of intrapersonal redistribu-
tion. The reasoning is as follows: when the principal recipients of transfers are the poorer
income groups, they finance less transfers themselves under progressive taxation (than the
rich individuals). This conjecture is confirmed by the results of Falkingham and Harding
(1996), who find that the extent of the intrapersonal redistribution varies considerably with
the inclusion of indirect taxes. Falkingham and Harding (1996) find a higher intrapersonal
redistribution after including indirect taxes in addition to direct taxes (i.e. the income tax,
and insurance contributions.) The intrapersonal redistribution increases from 38% to 52%
in Australia and from 62% to 71% in Great Britain.
Baldini (2001) also studies the intrapersonal redistribution for two different methods of
financing the transfers. He distinguishes between the personal income tax with and with-
out social insurance contributions, ignoring the indirect taxes completely. Baldini (2001)
reports an intrapersonal redistribution of about 77%, irrespective of the financing method.
However, the intrapersonal redistribution exhibits a more progressive pattern, when social
insurance contributions are ignored. Furthermore, Baldini (2001) singles out that part of
the redistribution which occurs within the same household and argues, that in Italy the
largest part of the redistribution can be attributed to the role of families instead of to the
redistribution via the public tax-benefit system.
Differences in the Base Year of the Cross Section
The timing of the cross-section data that has been used in the different models varies
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considerably as can be seen in Table 2.1. Falkingham and Harding (1996) e.g. use data on
Britain from the mid ’80s while most other studies rely on data from roughly ten or more
years later. Most recent data from 2002 is used by Sorensen et al. (2006).
Different timing of cross-section data will distort the comparison of intrapersonal in-
come redistribution even when applying the same method for one country, since differences
in data will also be affected by external factors, such as e.g. different policy regimes and
business-cycle fluctuations.
Differences that Reflect Various Welfare States
The different results of the various models may also be partly explained by the underlying
social security system of the respective country that is analyzed. Naturally, different welfare
states offer different kinds of transfers. But even when considering the same transfers across
countries, large differences may arise, when the entitlement to the transfer in question varies
across countries. Moreover, the duration over which the transfer can be received may vary
substantially. Generally, one can expect that in countries, in which the tax-benefit system
is mainly based on social insurance, the intrapersonal redistribution will be higher than in
countries with mainly means-tested transfers. Social insurance is designed to transfer the
risk over the life cycle of an individual, while the main purpose of means-tested transfers is to
alleviate poverty. Ceteris paribus, one would expect Sweden to have a higher intrapersonal
redistribution than e.g. Australia which, according to Falkingham and Harding (1996) is
one of the purest social-assistance systems in the world. As can be seen in Table 2.1, this is
exactly a finding that these studies reveal. Extrapolating this insight, we expect the extent
of the German intrapersonal redistribution to lie somewhere between the one of Australia
and Sweden.
In general, the calculation of intrapersonal income redistribution will be severely affected
by the methodological differences which we have highlighted above. It is therefore crucial to
keep in mind, which methodology has been applied, when comparing the results for various
countries or even within one specific country.
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2.3 Modeling Synthetic Life Cycles
2.3.1 Preparation of the Data Set
In this study we use the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP 2011) data set. This is
a longitudinal panel surveying approximately 12,000 private households in Germany. The
underlying dataset covers East and West German data. For our analysis we are interested
in those individuals whose data are reported consistently over time, between the years 1996
- 2004 in the SOEP sample. In order to ensure that major economic effects due to the
German reunification and the immediate economic effects in the following years are not
driving the results of the calculations, the sampling period starts in 1996. The end of the
sampling period in 2004 ensures that a major change in the social security system that was
introduced in 2005 is not included in the dataset.
We focus on individuals in their working age (18 - 64 years) and therefore drop retirees
and children from the sample. Moreover, we focus on those individuals whose income is
mainly obtained from wages and salaries. Therefore we exclude those individuals who have
been predominantly self-employed (e.g. for more than 5 years) and disregard civil servants.
Some of the remaining individuals have changed their occupational position during the
investigated time period. They will only be dropped from the sample if they are part of
one of the categories above (children, self-employed, retirees, civil servants) for at least four
years. This implies that an individual, who is for instance employed during the age 60 to
64 will still remain in the sample, even though the individual enters retirement at age 65.
Overall this leaves 7,774 individuals (2,970 men and 4,804 women) in the sample, which we
use in our matching procedure to generate synthetic life cycles. On average these individuals
represent about 26.5 million working-age Germans.
From the SOEP data set we extract data on transfers (on the individual and household
level), annual income (gross labour income, and income from other sources), as well as var-
ious personal characteristics such as the education level, gender and marital status. Tax
data are based on our own calculations. In the following, we provide a detailed overview of
our data preparation process.
Transfers
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For our analysis, we consider cash benefits such as means-tested benefits and insurance
benefits. We disregard non-cash benefits (e.g. the private use of public subsides). We
distinguish between individual and household transfers. Since our analysis focuses on in-
dividuals, we have to break down the household transfers to individual levels. Therefore,
we assume that the transfer is incident equally on each adult member of the household.
Consequently, we divide the household transfers by the number of adults. Table 2.2 lists all
transfers that are included in this analysis. Unemployment benefits e.g., make up 20% of all
Individual transfers
Unemployment benefits
Unemployment assistance
Subsistence allowance
Early retirement benefit
Maternity leave benefit
Student grants
Household transfers
Child allowance
House assistance
Nursing allowance
Social assistance
Social assistance for special circumstances
Social assistance for the elderly
Housing support for owners - occupiers
Table 2.2: List of Transfers Included in the Analysis
transfers in 2004. This is clearly the biggest share within the group of individual transfers
and the level of unemployment benefit is income-related. The entitlement of unemployment
benefits depends on the individual history of contributions to unemployment insurance.
Within the group of household transfers, the child allowance is by far the most important
transfer, making up 20% of total transfers 6. Finally, old-age pensions are a very important
part of the transfers that individuals receive over their lifetime. However, as our analysis
focuses on the working life of the individuals, the effect of old-age pensions is disregarded.
Taxes
Unfortunately, data on individual tax liabilities are not provided by the SOEP data set. As
6If applicable, the child allowance includes also the tax reduction due to tax exemption for dependent
children.
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a consequence, we have to compute the annual individual tax liabilities. In particular, we
use the the German tax code together with the individuals’ idiosyncratic characteristics,
such as the number of children and marital status to calculate the individual tax burden.
The progressive income tax rate is applied to the individual income, while the tax burden
for married couples is based on the combined household income. In the latter case, we
assume that each partner pays income taxes on half of the taxable income of the household.
Thereafter, we attribute a share of the tax payment to the individual, according to the
actual original income. This ensures that e.g. the individual tax payment of a woman, who
does not earn any income, is zero. The whole tax burden of the household is attributed to
her (working) husband, even though it is determined through the income-splitting tax rule.
Neglecting this aspect would bias our results, as individuals with zero income would finance
transfers that they receive through their ”artificial” tax payment.
The SOEP data set does also not include individual data on earnings from dividends
and interest. We therefore use the provided household data and assume, that each adult
member of the household earns an equal amount of these earnings. We proceed likewise in
calculating individual data on rent income.
In order to determine the taxable income of the individuals and married couples, we
apply all standard allowances and standard exemptions. Accordingly, we deduct the lump-
sum allowance for professional expenses and for earnings from dividends and interest, the
standard deduction for special expenses, the provisional lump-sum with regard to old-age
insurance, and the single-parent tax allowance, whenever applicable. The tax allowance
for the elderly is not applied, as our life cycle ends with 65 years. The tax exemption for
dependent children is considered if it is more advantageous for the tax payer than receiving
child allowance transfers. Table 2.3 provides the details on the calculation of the German
taxable income.
The SOEP data also does not provide information on the individual indirect tax payments.
There are two approaches in the literature reviewed in Section 2.2. The first approach,
followed by Falkingham and Harding (1996), uses a percentage of gross income to model
direct and indirect taxes and argues that the joint impact of both taxes is proportional
on gross income. In the German case however, the progressive effect of the income tax
(including social security contributions and solidarity surcharge) dominates the regressive
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Sign Legal income concepts and their components
Income from agriculture, forestry and business enterprise
+ Income from self-employment and dependent employment
+ Income from capital, renting and leasing
+ Other income
= Positive income from all sources
- Negative income
= Income from all sources
- Tax allowance for elderly persons (for people over 64)
- Tax allowance for agriculture and forestry
= Adjusted gross income
- Special and extraordinary expenses (actual or lump-sum)
- ”Loss-deductions” (reimbursements, loss carry forwards)
= Income
- Tax allowance for children (Kinderfreibetrag)
- Single parents’ tax allowance (Alleinerziehendenentlastungsbetrag)
= Taxable income (the tax base)
Progression Clause (Progressionsvorbehalt)
+ Unemployment Benefits (also from part-time unemployment)
+ Short-term Work Compensations
+ Insolvency and severance Benefits
+ Parental-leave and Maternity-leave Benefits
+ Sickness and injury Benefits
+ Transfer and seasonal Short-term Work Compensations
+ Benefits for Early Retirement
+ Supplemented labour costs for employment
= Taxable income according to p.c. (determining the tax rate)
Table 2.3: Taxable Income, adapted from Ochmann and Fossen (2012)
nature of indirect taxes and social security contributions. The joint effect on the equivalent
net household income of both kinds of taxes therefore remains progressive (RWI and Fifo
Ko¨ln (2007)). The second approach, followed by Sorensen et al. (2006), determines the
percentage of the annual disposable income that equals the indirect tax burden in each
income decile. We adopt the latter, more detailed approach. The data on the indirect tax
burden of German households are based on RWI and Fifo Ko¨ln (2007). The indirect taxes
include the value-added tax, the mineral tax and the motor vehicle tax.
Studies using dynamic cohort microsimulation models commonly assume a world with
a constant economic environment. In these studies the tax- and transfer rules are fixed ac-
cording to one specific base year and prevail throughout the whole simulated lifetime. One
common justification for this approach is, that these studies aim at analyzing one policy
and aim at isolating the effect of this specific policy from others. However, labour participa-
tion decisions of the individuals (such as the incentive to work and the individuals’ leisure
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choice,... etc) are all affected by the tax-benefit system that prevails in the corresponding
year. It is therefore problematic to decouple the behavior and labour participation deci-
sions from the corresponding tax-benefit rules that prevail in that year. We therefore use
the contemporaneous tax environment for each year.
Another important aspect to consider is that the tax-benefit system used for modeling
synthetic life cycles is not in financial equilibrium. Over the lifetime of the individuals, the
sum of total direct taxes exceeds the sum of all transfers. Only a share of taxes is therefore
used to finance the transfers. The rest is devoted to financing other public expenditures
such as infrastructure and education. In order to achieve financial equilibrium over the
lifetime of the individuals, we need to identify the correct share of taxes that is used to
finance the transfers. Following the literature we use the percentage of the lifetime taxes,
that equals the lifetime transfers. We call this adjusted amount of taxes ”allocated taxes”.
According to our discussion above, our analysis uses two different scenarios for the un-
derlying financing of transfers. In the first scenario, we assume that only direct taxes (i.e.
the income tax and the unemployment insurance contributions) are used to finance the
transfers. In the second scenario, we assume that direct and indirect taxes are used to
finance the transfers.
Income
We want to create the synthetic life cycles by relying on an income definition that is a close
proxy for the standard of living standard. Table 2.4 shows how we use the SOEP data set
to determine the equivalent disposable income.
Income type
Labour Income
+ Capital Income
+ Rent Income
= Original Income
+ Transfers
= Gross Income
- Direct Taxes
- Indirect Taxes
= Disposable Income
/ Equivalence Scales
= Equivalent Disposable Income
Table 2.4: Income Definitions
19
When we use the term original income, we refer to the combined labour income, capital
income and rent income of the individual. In order to derive the gross income, we add
the transfers received by the individual. As already explained, these transfers include the
individualized household transfers. We calculate the disposable income by deducting the
income tax, social security contributions and the supplementary tax (e.g. solidarity tax)
from the gross income. We do not deduct the church tax, as we regard this being a voluntary
expense.
In order to derive the equivalent disposable income, we have to account for different
household sizes and family structures of each individual. Therefore, we apply equivalence
scales to the disposable income of the household. There are several equivalence scales that
can be applied. They differ according to the weights that are given to each member of the
household. We apply the modified OECD equivalence scale to the income, as this is widely
accepted. This scale attributes a weight of 1 to the first adult household member, a weight
of 0.5 to each additional adult and a weight of 0.3 to each child.
2.3.2 The Matching Method
As already mentioned, the GSOEP data set does not provide data on income, transfers and
taxes for the entire working life of a German individual. Our approach to deal with this
problem is to generate synthetic life cycles by linking data of several individuals from our
reduced SOEP sample dataset. Algorithm 1 presents our matching algorithm. The individ-
uals forming one synthetic life cycle should ideally exhibit the same personal characteristics.
We impose some criteria for homogeneity among the individuals in our sample and group
them according to their education level and gender. In particular, we distinguish three levels
of education attainment. The lowest education level (1) represents all individuals who have
less than eleven years of education. The medium education level (2) contains all individuals
with at least eleven and less than twelve years of education. The highest education level
(3) includes all individuals with more than twelve years of education. In the subsequent
matching procedure the individuals will only be matched to form a life cycle if they are in
the same education level group.
Algorithm 1 - Matching Algorithm for Generating Synthetic Life Cycles
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This algorithm describes the procedure of matching individuals to generate synthetic life
cycles. Required information are individual’s gender, education level, equivalent disposable
income, taxes, transfers and personal weight in the data set. The data are required for nine
consecutive years.
(Grouping phase)
Step 1: Sort all individuals into groups of gender and three education levels.
Step 2: Generate eight life-cycle cohorts. Each life-cycle cohort consists of individuals born
in the same year and those individuals being born eight or multiples of eight years apart.
Each life-cycle cohort consists of 6 or 7 life-cycle groups.
Step 3: Combine Steps 1 and 2 to obtain 54 life-cycle groups.
(Matching phase)
Step 4 Within a life-cycle cohort, match individual i with income Ii and year of birth y
with individual j with income Ij and year of birth y+ 8 if: | Ii− Ij |≤ m1 +m2 · I2i . Repeat
for all life-cycle groups.
(Synthesizing data phase)
Step 5. Combine contemporaneous data on income, taxes and transfers of the matched
individuals to generate data of the synthetic life cycles.
(Weight adjustment phase)
Step 5. Gather information on the frequency of each individual in the synthetic life cycles.
Use that information together with the individual’s weight in the original data set to com-
pute a representative weight of each synthetic life cycle.
The matching procedure itself is similar to the one used by Sorensen et al. (2006). In our
model one synthetic life cycle consists of the observations of six or seven individuals. For
instance, an individual of group 1 in life-cycle cohort 1 (born in 1978 - 26 years old in 2004)
is matched with another individual of the same gender and education level (born in 1970
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- 26 years old in 1996, of group 2) in life-cycle cohort 1. This procedure is repeated until
a synthetic life cycle is created which consists of the data provided by six (or seven) real
individuals. The same matching procedure is applied to all life-cycle cohorts. The exact
allocation of years of birth among the different life-cycle cohorts is shown in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Allocation of Years of Birth among Life-Cycle Cohorts
Our matching procedure is based on the equivalent disposable income of the individuals
in the year in which the individuals are matched. As explained in Section 2.3.1 this takes
into account the family size and the family structure. Furthermore, it is a more accurate
measure of the individual living standard than any other income variable. In practice, using
the equivalized income implies that two individuals are matched when they experience the
same living standard. Consider e.g. individual A, who has a disposable income of 100,000
and is living in a family with 2 children and no spouse. According to the equivalence scale
procedure, the income of individual A will be scaled down by a factor of 1.6, which results
in an equivalent disposable income of 62,500. Next, consider individual B who lives in a
single household and has a disposable income of 62,500. The equivalent disposable income
of individual B is also 62,500. Both, A and B will be matched since they have the same
equivalent disposable income (as in this example) or if their incomes are within a certain
range, as described by step 4 in algorithm 17. As a consequence, some individuals will
not be matched at all, because their income is not close enough to the income of someone
7In particular, we use m1 = 5, 000 and m2 = 3 · 10−6.
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from the older (younger) life-cycle group. They drop out of the data set. In the end 2,454
men and 3,086 women are actually matched. Some of them are matched more than once.
In some cases (e.g. many individuals with zero income) our approach generates a large
amount of matches. In such a case, we draw a random sample from the matched data. In
total, our matching procedure generates 200,000 synthetic life cycles out of the initial 7,774
individuals.
The individuals from the original SOEP data set are each associated with a personal
weight. If an individual e.g. has a sampling weight of 100, it means that the individual
represents 100 Germans of working age. The subset of individuals in the database used for
the calculations represents on average 26.5 million Germans. Ignoring the individual weights
would lead to biased results, as certain subsets of the population would be oversampled. A
similar problem could occur with our synthetic life-cycle data. Since some of the individuals
are matched multiple times while others are not matched at all, our generated synthetic
life-cycle data set is no longer representative of the German population. The individual
weights that are provided by the SOEP data set are not valid and need to be adjusted.
We therefore use the SOEP data set weights for all individuals, who form one synthetic life
cycle, to adjust for their disproportional occurrence in the synthetic life cycles.
2.4 Analysis of Synthetic Life-Cycle Data
Here, we present the results of the synthetic life cycles that were generated using the match-
ing procedure explained in Section 2.3.2. First, we look at the development of the income
data over the life cycle. Next, we analyze the redistributional impact of our synthetic life-
time data. We compare the distribution of the lifetime income with the annual income data
and investigate whether the German lifetime income is indeed more evenly distributed than
the annual income as shown for other countries in the related literature. This gives a first
indication for the extent of intrapersonal income redistribution. The latter will be analyzed
in more detail in Section 2.5.
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2.4.1 Annual vs Lifetime Income
We calculate the lifetime income of each synthetic individual by summing up the income over
all years8. Using the life-cycle weight for each individual, we compute the average income
for each age of the entire synthetic working-age population. The left plot in Figure 2.2
depicts the labour income and the equivalent disposable income. The average labor income
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Figure 2.2: Average Labor- and Equivalent Disposable Income: Total (left) and Gender-
Specific (right).
(black line) follows a hump-shape pattern with a sharp rise until the age of 25. Our results
imply that highest earnings are concentrated in the prime working years between 25 and 55
with a maximum at around the age of 43. A similar result is obtained by Fennel and Stark
(2005). Finally, labor income falls rapidly beyond the age of 55. The equivalent disposable
income rises less sharply up to age 35 after which it basically remains constant. Our data
show only a slight decline after age 60. One interesting result is that while labor income
is initially clearly higher than equivalent disposable income, individuals aged 59 and older
actually have a lower labor income than their corresponding equivalent disposable income.
One reason for that observation could be that a sharp drop in the equivalent disposable
8As in Sorensen et al. (2006) and Falkingham and Harding (1996), we assume that the discount rate equals
the real economic (earnings) growth rate.
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income does not occur after e.g. age 55 because lower equivalence scales are applied to
the income of parents whose children left the joint household. Other reasons can be found
when looking at gender-specific income data as shown in the right plot of Figure 2.2. The
dotted lines indicate that the equivalent disposable income of men (black) and women (grey)
exhibits the same pattern, with men having a slightly higher income. However, we see a huge
difference in the actual labor income between men and women. Men experience on average
a hump-shaped income pattern with a maximum income in their early forties, reflecting
intuitive assumptions on working experience and productivity patterns. On the contrary,
the average labor income of women clearly seems to be affected by starting a family, thus
hampering their career perspectives. Women’s labor income picks up only slightly between
age 35 and 50, but sharply falls thereafter and even reaches zero for the 64 and 65 year old9.
In general, the average labor income of women between age 25 and 55 is about only half
of the labor income of men. Furthermore, women between age 30-43 and beyond age 50
experience their labour income being below their equivalent disposable income. Certainly,
one reason for that is the change in equivalence scaling. Another reason seems to be a large
amount of redistribution within households, with a large transfer of income from men to
women. The latter fact also provides an explanation for the equivalent disposable income
of men generally being far below their average labour income.
2.4.2 Transfers and Allocated Taxes
Table 2.5 compares annual data from 2004 with the corresponding synthetic life-cycle results.
In order to facilitate the comparison with the annual data, the lifetime incomes, transfers
and taxes have been annualized, i.e. divided by the number of years of each synthetic life
cycle.
Regarding the income, Table 2.5 shows that, income is more evenly distributed using
annualized lifetime data than when using annual data. Furthermore, the absolute value of
allocated taxes is rising with higher income deciles, but less steep over a lifetime than in the
cross-section. In both cases the allocated taxes exhibit a progressive pattern, as the shares
9The latter fact however, might be due to our matching procedure. Some women who actually do have
positive labor income at age 64 and 65 are not being matched at all.
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of taxes relative to income rise with higher income deciles. The share of taxes relative to
income ranges from 0 to 19% using the annual allocated taxes relative to annual income,
and from from 7% to 22% using lifetime allocated taxes relative to lifetime income. Thus,
the progressivity of taxes is more harmonized over the lifetime.
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10
Annual Data (2004)
Income 438 4036 7449 10062 12092 14068 16186 18922 22854 33329
Transfers 630 2371 2000 1599 1646 1561 1210 1458 1243 1435
Allocated Taxes 0 48 242 275 464 613 1075 1707 2567 6535
Transfers/Income 1.5 0.64 0.27 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.05
Allocated Taxes / Income 0 0.09 0.033 0.03 0.04 0.04 0. 07 0.9 0.11 0.19
Annualized Lifetime Data
Income 8226 10323 11333 12153 12914 13669 14512 15537 16949 20533
Transfers 2186 1993 1891 1810 1794 1711 1702 1708 1726 1691
Allocated Taxes 581 903 1110 1282 1471 1670 1881 2187 2701 4431
Transfers / Income 0.27 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.08
Allocated Taxes / Income 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.22
Table 2.5: Means of Annual and Annualized Lifetime Values (in 2004 euros) by Deciles of
Equivalent Disposable Income
Next, we consider lifetime transfers. Table 2.5 shows that the lifetime transfers fall with
rising income. Furthermore, when looking at the transfers-income ratio, the progressive
nature of the transfers is clearly observable in the lifetime data. The transfers of the lowest
decile constitute on average 27% of their lifetime income. This share falls to 8% for the
10th decile.
In a next step, we provide more information on our lifetime data. In particular, we
discuss how taxes, transfers and income are distributed over the lifetime of individuals.
Table 2.6 reports the lifetime shares of allocated taxes, transfers and equivalent disposable
income, which are attributed to each decile of the synthetic working-age population. We
note that the share of lifetime transfers is quite harmonized over the income deciles. While
the lifetime poorest decile receives about 12% of total transfers, the lifetime richest decile
receives about 9.3% of total transfers.
On the contrary, allocated taxes are more heterogeneously distributed over the lifetime
income deciles. Our data show that nearly a quarter of the entire allocated tax burden of
the whole working-age population is borne by the lifetime richest 10% of the population.
26
Lifetime Data D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10
Transfers 12 10.9 10.4 10 10 9.4 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.3
Allocated Taxes 3 5 6 7 8 9 10.3 12 14.8 24.33
Income 6 7.5 8.3 8.9 9.5 10 10.7 11.4 12.5 15
Table 2.6: Lifetime Shares of Allocated Taxes, Transfers and Equivalent Disposable Income.
This indicates the effectiveness of the German welfare state to redistribute income. In fact,
we observe that when considering equivalent disposable life-cycle income, the richest decile
accounts for less than three times the income of the poorest decile.
The results shown in Tables 2.5 and 2.6 suggest that for Germany, the current estimates
on the redistributive impact of the tax-benefit system overestimate the actual redistribution
between individuals. A significant share of the income redistribution can be attributed to
a reallocation of income over the entire life cycle of individuals. The principal recipients
of transfers are in the lower part of the income distribution, while the highest two deciles
contribute about 40% of the tax payments. This indicates that the extent of self-financed
transfers will rise with higher income deciles. We will calculate the extent of this intraper-
sonal income redistribution in Section 2.5.
2.4.3 Implications for Income Inequality
Our results so far indicate that using equivalent disposable income instead of pure labor
income will have strong implications for the assessment of the income distribution. When
looking, e.g. at the gender-specific labor income, Figure 2.2 suggests that women are dis-
proportionately located in the lower end of the income distribution, while using equivalent
disposable income brings about much more equality between genders. In the following, we
put special focus on the implications of our synthetic life-cycle data on income inequality.
Extending the accounting period from one year to a whole lifetime indeed reduces the
inequality of income of Germany. The Gini coefficient drops from 0.3685 using annual data
to 0.1492 using lifetime data. Lifetime estimations thus significantly reduce the income
inequality (The Gini drops by 60%). This confirms the expectation that annual data over-
estimate the extent of interpersonal income redistribution. The snapshot of the income in
the cross-section neglects the intrapersonal redistribution that takes place over the lifetime
of the individuals. As individuals are mobile between income deciles during their life, the
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lifetime incomes are more equally distributed than the annual data. For example, a student
who appears to be poor in a cross-section sample may earn considerably more later in life,
and therefore move to a higher income decile when annualized lifetime data are consid-
ered. Consequently, a large part of the redistribution can be attributed to a reallocation
of resources within the life of an individual, resulting in a lower Gini coefficient of lifetime
incomes.
Comparing our Gini coefficient with official statistics, we note that our Gini coefficient
is higher and thus reports a higher level of income inequality. For instance, the Gini coeffi-
cient reported by the OECD is 0.288 for the equivalent disposable household income of the
working-age population in the mid 2000s, compared to our Gini coefficient of 0.3685 using
annual income data in our calculations. Our higher Gini coefficient reflects the different
earnings structure in our initial sample population. As explained in Section 2.3.1 we drop
a large number of individuals from our data set and disregard for instance employees who
have been self-employed for more than 4 years, civil servants, ...etc. This implies, that our
sample includes a disproportionately higher share of individuals with zero or low income.
Overall, our sample population is poorer and more unevenly distributed than the average
presented by for instance the OECD. Table 2.7 presents the Gini coefficients applied to the
different lifetime income concepts.
Income Gini Change in Gini Gini (men) Gini (women)
Lifetime Original Income 0.3028 0.1839 0.2665
Lifetime Gross Income 0.2493 -17.4% 0.1517 0.2014
Lifetime Disposable Income 0.2209 -11.4% 0.1261 0.1734
Lifetime Equivalent Disposable Income 0.1492 -32.5% 0.1384 0.1542
Annual Equivalent Disposable Income 0.3685
Table 2.7: Gini of Annualized Lifetime Income
According to Table 2.7, the redistribution through transfers (from original income to gross
income) is larger than the equalizing effect of taxes. Lifetime transfers reduce the Gini
coefficient by 17.4% while lifetime taxes reduce the Gini coefficient only by 11.4%.
Overall, the combined redistributive effect of the tax-transfer system appears to be
slightly lower (29.1%) than the redistribution occurring within families (32.5%). The im-
pact of the income redistribution within households on income inequality can be seen by
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comparing the disposable income with the equivalent disposable income. As shown above,
the income earned by women is substantially lower than that of men. Thus, the Gini co-
efficients above confirm that the redistribution of lifetime income occurring within families
(and through the tax-benefit system) is largely a redistribution from rich men to poorer
women.
The equalizing effect of transfers is more pronounced for women than for men. Transfers
reduce male income inequality by 17.5% while the income inequality of women is reduced by
24.4%. On the other hand, the impact of taxes is more equalizing for men than for women.
This may be explained by the fact that women are the principal recipients of transfers,
while men contribute more to the overall tax payments.
As mentioned above, using lifetime data discloses strong implications for the inequality
of income between the genders. Comparing the Gini coefficients of the lifetime disposable
income with the equivalent disposable income, we see that the redistribution within families
occurs mainly from men to women. The Gini coefficient of female lifetime disposable income
drops from 0.1734 to 0.1542 (equivalent disp. lifetime income), while the Gini coefficient
for men even rises from 0.1261 to 0.1384.
The results shown above are consistent with the results of other studies, which also find
that the annual income is less equally distributed than the lifetime income (Sorensen et al.
(2006), Falkingham and Harding (1996)), Pettersson and Pettersson (2003)).
Our analysis of annual and lifetime income data shows that the income redistribution
from rich to poor individuals is overestimated in the annual data. Instead, a large part is
can be attributed to intrapersonal redistribution. In the following section we will calculate
the extent of intrapersonal income redistribution in Germany.
2.5 Inter- and Intrapersonal Redistribution of Income
In this section, we use the synthetic life cycle data on taxes and transfers to calculate the
intra- and interpersonal income redistribution. In order to disentangle these two different
components of income redistribution, we apply the method by Falkingham and Harding
(1996), which we describe below. Furthermore, we replace the term allocated taxes by
simply taxes for convenience.
The total intrapersonal redistribution of income is the sum of all transfers that has
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been self-financed during the life cycle of the individuals. Thus, the amount of transfers
received in a lifetime needs to be compared to the amount of lifetime tax payments for
each individual. The smaller of the two sums can be considered as self-financed over the
lifetime. Given the data on all synthetic individuals over t periods, we first calculate the
lifetime transfers Bi for each synthetic individual i. We proceed in the same fashion with
the calculation of lifetime allocated taxes, which we denote as Ti for individual i. Both,
lifetime transfers and taxes are therefore given by:
Bi =
∑
t
Bit and Ti =
∑
t
Tit
Consequently, total life-cycle transfers, which are self-financed by individual i are given by:
Bsfi = min(Bi, Ti)
As a result, the total nominal amount of intrapersonal redistribution is given by the sum of
all self-financed transfers of all individuals:
Rintra =
∑
i
Bsfi
Next, in order to compute the total nominal amount of interpersonal redistribution, we first
calculate net lifetime transfers of individual i by summing up annual net transfers over t:
Bneti =
∑
t
Bit − Tit
An individual may have a negative net balance for a certain year if taxes exceed transfers
in that year. However, that individual may accumulate a positive net balance over the
life course when total lifetime transfers Bi exceed total lifetime tax payments Ti. We
call synthetic individuals with Bneti > 0 net recipients and individuals with B
net
i < 0 net
payers. The interpersonal redistribution of income is the amount of taxes and benefits that
are transferred from the lifetime rich to the lifetime poor. We have already mentioned
that in our context, allocated taxes denote that part of total taxes that is used to finance
the transfers and therefore are equal to total transfers. Therefore, the lifetime negative
net balances (= net lifetime taxes) equals the lifetime positive balances (= net lifetime
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transfers). As a result, the the total nominal amount of interpersonal redistribution of
income is the sum of the positive (or negative) net lifetime balances:
Rinter =
∑
i
Bneti if B
net
i < 0
=
∑
i
Bneti if B
net
i > 0
We can now use the the total nominal amount of inter- and intrapersonal redistribution
of income to calculate the intrapersonal share as Sintra = Rintra/(Rintra + Rinter). The
decomposition of the income redistribution can be done for selected transfers separately, or
for all combined transfers and tax payments. In the following, we discuss both. Finally, we
apply these calculations to the extended tax concept, which includes indirect taxes as well
as direct taxes.
2.5.1 Intrapersonal Redistribution of Income Using Direct Taxes
We first report the share of intrapersonal income redistribution based on direct taxes. Ta-
ble 2.8 presents the details of the German intrapersonal income redistribution for deciles of
equivalent disposable income.
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10
Lifetime Data
Income 394820 495500 543980 583320 619890 656120 696580 745790 813580 985570
Allocated Taxes 27874 43342 53258 61530 70602 80122 90285 104980 129630 212680
Transfers 104910 95675 90760 86900 86128 82109 81708 81959 82857 81299
Annualized Lifetime Data
Balance (Net Recipients) 1688 1349 1134 1023 985 838 841 778 742 727
Balance (Net Payers) 358 525 569 663 735 829 953 1129 1565 3065
Share of Net Recipients 96 87 79 71 62 52 43 34 26 9
Share of Net Payers 4 14 21 29 38 48 57 66 74 91
Share of SF Transfers 31.9 49.67 60.06 67.68 73.94 80.92 84.65 89.06 92.67 97.67
Table 2.8: Means of Lifetime Values (in 2004 euros) by Deciles of Equivalent Disposable
Lifetime Income
Over their lifetime individuals in the lowest income decile (D1) receive on average 104,910e
in transfers, while they pay 27,874e allocated taxes. The vast majority of the individuals
belonging to D1 are net recipients over their lifetime: the annualized net lifetime balance
of the individuals, who are net recipients over their lifetime, amounts to 1,688 euros on
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average. However, even in the lowest part of the income distribution some individuals are
net lifetime payers. Nearly 18% of the individuals who are net payers over their lifetime
belong to the two lowest income deciles (D1 and D2). At the same time, almost 35% of the
individuals are net recipients over their lifetime, despite belonging to the upper two income
deciles (D9 and D10).
The overall average intrapersonal redistribution of income that is derived from all trans-
fers is 63.06%. It shows that only a minor fraction of the benefits is actually redistributed
from the lifetime rich to the lifetime poor. Instead, the majority of the transfers is financed
from taxes paid at another point in life of the same taxpayer. As expected, the share of self-
financed transfers rises with higher income deciles. It ranges from 31.9% in D1 to 97.67%
in D10. This implies that even in the lowest income decile about a third of the transfers is
actually financed by the same taxpayer over the lifetime. The rising share of self-financed
transfers over the income distribution reflects the progressive structure of taxes and also
the decreasing share of lifetime transfers over the lifetime income distribution.
The results of the intrapersonal income redistribution compare well to the results of other
studies. The extent of the German intrapersonal income redistribution lies in the range
of Italy/Sweden and Australia/Ireland. As discussed in Section 2.2, the inherent model
structure clearly affects the estimated results. Our results are most similar to the results for
Britain (Falkingham and Harding (1996)), where the transfers exhibit a similarly flat pattern
across the income distribution. In general, welfare states in which transfers are mostly based
on social-insurance contributions will experience a lower interpersonal redistribution from
the lifetime rich to the lifetime poor than a more means - tested welfare system (Falkingham
and Harding (1996), OECD (2007)). In our data, one of the main drivers of the lifetime
transfers are the unemployment benefits, which are financed by unemployment insurance
contributions. This could provide an explanation why the extent of the intrapersonal income
redistribution exceeds that of countries, in which transfers are mainly directed at poverty-
alleviation, such as Australia.
In general, our estimates on the extent of the German intrapersonal redistribution are
rather at the lower bound. One reason is that we focus on the working life of the individuals
and do not take the retirement phase into account. Including old-age pension transfers will
raise the extent of intrapersonal income redistribution, as the degree of self-financing of
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old-age pensions is above average (Pettersson and Pettersson (2003)). Other studies con-
firm our intuition. Sorensen et al. (2006) and Baldini (2001) e.g. include old-age pension
transfers and find a higher intrapersonal income redistribution for Sweden and Italy.
Moreover, as mentioned in Section 2.3.1, our initial data sample includes a high proportion
of individuals with a relatively low income. As the extent of intrapersonal income redistri-
bution rises with higher incomes, our estimates on the intrapersonal income redistribution
are likely to increase when individuals with a higher income are included in the analysis.
We find that at least a third of the transfers are self-financed. This suggests that about
a third of the current redistribution through taxes and transfers could be reduced if there
were another mechanism that allows a reallocation of income over the lifetime. This share
is even higher for the higher income deciles.
2.5.2 Results for Selected Transfers - Using Direct Taxes
So far, we have reported the shares of intrapersonal income redistribution using all com-
bined transfers. Next, we present the results on the intrapersonal redistribution for selected
transfers. The unemployment benefits are worth considering due to their high share in the
overall transfers. The unemployment benefits are financed through unemployment insur-
ance contributions. This suggests that there should be a significant extent of intrapersonal
redistribution as all individuals, who are entitled to receive these transfers, have paid un-
employment insurance contributions in the past or will do so in the future in case of em-
ployment. We also present the share of intrapersonal redistribution for maternity benefits.
The extent of the interpersonal redistribution should be higher than for other transfers as
maternity benefits are by definition a gender-specific transfer. Only women are entitled to
maternity benefits after giving birth. Therefore, there should be a large share of income that
is reallocated from men to women, raising the interpersonal component. The last specific
transfer we consider, are the child benefits. In contrast to maternity benefits, they are not
gender-specific, but rather paid to both parents. The interpersonal income redistribution
should therefore be lower than in the case of maternity benefits.
The results in presented in Table 2.9 show that the intrapersonal income redistribution
varies considerably when selected transfer types are considered. As expected, the intraper-
sonal income redistribution with respect to maternity benefits is quite low. It amounts to
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21% and is 42% lower than the intrapersonal redistribution for all combined transfers.
Sintra Sinter
All transfers 63.06 36.94
Unemployment Benefits 51.72 48.28
Maternity Benefits 21 79
Child Benefits 64.66 35.34
Table 2.9: Intrapersonal Income Redistribution for Selected Transfers
A large part of the redistribution thus takes place from the lifetime rich to the lifetime poor,
and in this case also from men to women. The redistribution from men to women occurs
through two channels. First, men are not entitled to receive this transfer type, and therefore
only women can ”use” their tax payments to self-finance the transfers. Second, men enjoy
a much higher equivalent disposable income than women, which raises the interpersonal
component even further.
The results with respect to child benefits are also consistent with our expectation, that
the interpersonal component should be much lower than in the case of maternity benefits.
Child benefits are paid to both partners of the household. This raises the intrapersonal
income redistribution to nearly 65%.
Focusing on unemployment benefits only, we find that a major part of the unemployment
benefits is self-financed. The intrapersonal redistribution with respect to unemployment
benefits is 51.72%. This implies that roughly half of the current unemployment insurance is
redistributed from the lifetime rich to the poor. Compared with the result on all combined
transfers of Section 2.5.1 there appears to be slightly more redistribution among individu-
als. Note, however, that even in the bottom decile 28% of the individuals are net payers,
compared to only 4% in the case of the combined transfers, as indicated by Table 2.10.
As in the case of all combined transfers, the share of net payers rises with higher in-
come deciles, but is more compressed over the income distribution when focusing only on
unemployment benefits. In the top decile, there are more net recipients in the case of un-
employment benefits (14%) than in the case of all combined transfers (9%). Out of all
unemployment benefits that are received during the lifetime even the low-income individu-
als finance about 43% of their transfers themselves. This is 34% more than in the case of
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Lifetime Data D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10
Share of SF transfers (all transfers) 32 50 60 68 74 81 85 89 93 98
Share of SF unemployment benefits 43 52 62 66 71 76 80 82 86 94
Share of SF maternity benefits 14 25 35 44 52 68 73 83 93 98
Share of SF child allowance 20 42 58 72 79 82 84 88 92 98
Share of Net Recipients 96 87 79 71 62 52 43 34 26 9
Share of Net Recipients (ub) 72 68 62 55 50 45 38 36 28 14
Share of Net Recipients (mat) 78 74 63 48 29 14 7 3 1 0.2
Share of Net Recipients (child) 99 96 85 69 56 48 45 38 28 10
Share of Net Payers 4 14 21 29 38 48 57 66 74 91
Share of Net Payers (ub) 28 32 38 45 50 55 62 64 72 86
Share of Net Payers (mat) 22 26 37 52 71 86 93 97 99 99.8
Share of Net Payers (child) 1 4 15 31 44 52 55 62 72 90
Table 2.10: Share of Intrapersonal Income Redistribution and Shares of Net Recipi-
ents/Payers for Selected Transfers by Deciles of Equivalent Disposable Income. (ub denotes
Unemployment Benefits, mat denotes Maternity Benefits and child denotes Child Benefits.)
all combined transfers. Finally, the share of self-financed transfers rises up to 94% in the
top decile, which is close to the 98% in the case of all combined transfers.
2.5.3 Intrapersonal Redistribution of Income Using Indirect Taxes
Using a different financing method for the transfers that includes both indirect taxes as well
as direct taxes, changes the results on the intrapersonal income redistribution as expected.
As explained in Section 2.3.1, indirect taxes exhibit a regressive pattern with respect to
income, implying that poorer individuals pay a relatively higher share of indirect taxes to
income than rich individuals. Using both direct and indirect taxes implies that the overall
tax structure is less progressive than when only using direct taxes. As the principal recipients
of transfers are in the bottom decile, including indirect taxes in the analysis should raise
the extent of the German intrapersonal income redistribution.
Sintra Sinter
Transfers financed by direct taxes 63.06 36.94
Transfers financed by direct and indirect taxes 73.76 26.24
Table 2.11: Intrapersonal Income Redistribution for Two Different Financing Methods
This is indeed what happens. Table 2.11 shows that the intrapersonal redistribution
amounts to 73.76% with direct and indirect taxes compared to 63.06% when only direct
taxes are used as financing method.
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As in Baldini (2001), we also find that the progressivity of the intrapersonal redistri-
bution changes with a different financing method. Table 2.12 shows that with direct taxes
nearly a third of the poor financed their benefits themselves. This rises to almost 50% in
the indirect tax case.
Lifetime Data D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10
Share of SF transfers (direct taxes) 31.9 49.67 60.06 67.68 73.94 80.92 84.65 89.06 92.67 97.67
Share of SF transfers (direct and indirect taxes) 47 64 73 79 83 88 90 92 95 98
Table 2.12: Share of Self-Financed Transfers by Deciles of Equivalent Disposable Income
for Two Different Financing Methods
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have calculated the intrapersonal income redistribution for Germany,
which is defined as the share of self-financed transfers over the entire life cycle of the average
working-age German. Considering that the working horizon marks 47 years (age 18 till age
64) an ideal data set would consists of a representative subset of all Germans over such
a long working horizon. Unfortunately, suitable data is only available for a shorter time
interval (using the SOEP data set), thus leaving out the most important component for
the analysis of life-cycle features, such as the intrapersonal income redistribution. We have
therefore applied a method of constructing life-cycle data by matching individuals with
similar socio-economic conditions and synthesizing their real-life data. Our method has
essentially enabled us to infer the dynamic evolution of income, transfers and taxes over the
entire life cycle. One particular obstacle to our method is the low degree of comparability
between income levels of individuals which is caused by the heterogeneity of their family
structures. We have overcome this comparability problem by applying equivalence scales to
the individuals’ income levels.
The analysis of our synthetic life-cycle data clearly shows that taxes and transfers are not
uniformly distributed over the life cycle and that the welfare state effectively redistributes
income from the lifetime poor to the lifetime rich to reduce inequality. In addition, our
results also reveal that an almost equally large amount of reduction in inequality is achieved
through income redistribution within households. In general, we observe that the life cycle
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adjusted degree of income inequality in Germany is much lower than the one implied by
data reflecting only a fraction or even a snapshot of the entire life cycle.
A closer examination of the income redistribution reveals that almost two thirds of all
transfers received by the average German over the life cycle are self-financed. Furthermore,
our results are consistent with those obtained in studies on welfare states exhibiting similar
characteristics as Germany. Seemingly, there is an enormous potential for the German
welfare state to utilize this remarkably high degree of intrapersonal income redistribution
for effectively redesigning labor market policies. One such labor market policy could aim
at restructuring the current German unemployment benefits system, in order to reduce
the distorting labor market incentives of the current tax-transfer system. In particular, a
system of individual unemployment accounts could prove to be the better alternative. The
average share of self-financed transfers is particularly high in the case of unemployment
benefits (51.72%). Out of all unemployment benefits that are received during the lifetime,
even the individuals in the poorest income decile finance about 43% of their unemployment
benefits themselves. However, most likely, in reality individuals do not perceive that a
significantly large share of their income reduction is transferred back to them over their
lifetime in the current unemployment benefit system. Therefore, unemployment accounts
exhibit a high potential in eliminating this misperception and serve as an engine, powering
up the individual’s incentives to participate in the labor market.
The following two chapters are devoted to the analysis of unemployment accounts and
their effect on employment incentives of individuals, pursuing decisions driven by rational,
forward-looking welfare-maximization motives.
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Chapter 3
Employment Incentives in the
Unemployment Accounts System
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2 we show that the income redistribution that is performed via the tax-benefit
system is not limited to transferring resources from the lifetime rich to the lifetime poor.
Instead, a major part of the tax-benefit system is designed to redistribute income during
the lifetime of an individual. We create life cycle data to replicate the development of
taxes and transfers during the working life. We are able to compute the intrapersonal
income redistribution, which is that part of the transfers which is self-financed by the same
taxpayer at another point in his life. We show that the intrapersonal income redistribution
makes up more than 60% of the German income redistribution.
Why is such a big share of income redistributed via the public tax-transfer system, when
it occurs during the life cycle of one individual? The negative externality created by this
public redistribution is a distortion of the individual labour market decisions (e.g. to en-
ter employment, to invest in education,... etc.) due to the imposition of taxes on income
(OECD (2007)). Moreover, the availability of transfers may induce the individual to in-
crease moral hazard. It could be more efficient if this individual himself would redistribute
his income over time, instead of engaging in income redistribution via the public tax-benefit
system. Private savings (or borrowing against future income) could serve as an alternative
mechanism through which the intrapersonal income redistribution can be achieved (OECD
(2007)). The reason why governments still engage in intrapersonal income redistribution is
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that market failures such as borrowing constraints impede the efficient functioning of con-
sumption smoothing via alternative mechanisms such as private savings (Sandmo (1999)).
Another obstacle to the voluntary private approach is that individuals may tend to ”un-
derestimate their own future needs” (Sandmo (1999)), as they cannot foresee their needs in
the future perfectly.
In this chapter we introduce mandatory individual welfare accounts as a new mecha-
nism through which the intrapersonal redistribution can be achieved. Transfers that are
suitable for the establishment of individual welfare accounts need to exhibit a large share
of intrapersonal income redistribution, as the exact purpose of the individual accounts is
to facilitate the redistribution of income within the life cycle of one individual. The re-
sults of the previous chapter suggest that unemployment benefits are suitable for individual
welfare accounts for several reasons: One is that the overall share of intrapersonal income
redistribution with respect to unemployment benefits is very high. Nearly half of the re-
distribution takes place within the life cycle of the same individual. Second, even in the
bottom income deciles more than 40% of the unemployment benefits are self-financed by
the tax payer. Third, the current design of the unemployment insurance system suggests
that individual accounts may substantially improve the efficient functioning of the labour
market by reducing the associated distortions. (This is in contrast to other transfers that
also exhibit a high intrapersonal redistribution, such as child benefits.)
In the current unemployment insurance system employed individuals pay unemployment
insurance and receive unemployment benefits in case of unemployment. Moral hazard will
therefore induce some employees to shirk and some unemployed to reduce their effort to find
a job. This affects the transition probabilities from employment to and from unemployment.
In our model set-up of individual unemployment accounts, individuals pay an unem-
ployment contribution into their own private account and pay traditional unemployment
insurance into a common fund. Once the individual is entitled to transfers, he can with-
draw the associated amount from his account. If this balance does not suffice to cover the
entire unemployment benefit, the government provides co-financing of the benefit via the
common fund. The balance that is left on the account at some pre-specified point in time
(for instance upon retirement) can be used to top up (pension) income. The take-up of
transfers is directly linked to the remaining balance of the individual account that can be
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rolled over to the private income.
The unemployment account system is therefore designed to reduce the above mentioned
moral hazard problems, as individuals are using ”their own” account money to finance their
unemployment spells. Thus, by internalizing the cost of unemployment, the individual
accounts may eventually reduce the distortionary effects that are present in the traditional
tax-benefit system (Brown et al. (2007)). A further advantage of the account system, is
that the design of the account system renders the link between unemployment benefits and
contributions more transparent. In the traditional insurance system, individuals are obliged
to pay unemployment insurance contributions without knowing whether they will ever be
entitled to receive unemployment support. In the account system, this money will not be
’lost’ but rather paid out upon retirement.
In short, substituting the traditional tax-benefit system with the individual accounts
therefore aims at two things: one is the reduction in distortionary taxes and transfers.
Moreover, individual accounts aim at stimulating labour market incentives, thereby lowering
the overall unemployment rate 1.
The goal of this chapter is to investigate whether replacing the traditional German
unemployment insurance system by unemployment accounts will improve the incentives to
work and thereby also the unemployment rate. Moreover, what is the impact on private
savings? Does the introduction of accounts raise overall private savings or are they a mere
substitute? Furthermore, we analyze whether a system of unemployment accounts is self-
financing. At last, we will answer the question whether the unemployment account system
is superior to the traditional unemployment insurance system in welfare terms.
Chile is one of the few countries which has established individual unemployment ac-
counts2. They were introduced in 2002 and have been widely used since then3. The Chilean
design of the account system is slightly different from our model set-up, in that individuals
as well as their employers pay unemployment contributions into the individual unemploy-
1As we will see later on, this may in turn induce a further reduction in the tax rate rate.
2For more detailed information on the unemployment account systems in Chile and other Latin American
countries, please refer to Robalino et al. (2009); Ferrer and Riddell (2009); Acevedo et al. (2006); Sehnbruch
(2004).
3According to the Superintendencia de Pensiones in Chile, about 136 790 members received unemployment
benefits in September 2012 (Superintendencia de Pensiones (2012)).
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ment accounts as well as into a solidarity fund. The government contributes additional
resources to the solidarity fund. During unemployment, the individuals withdraw money
from their individual unemployment account. The access to the solidarity fund is restricted
to specific groups of workers based on the layoff of the individual and the previous type of
job contract. Moreover, the access to the solidarity fund is limited to individuals who have
insufficient balances on their individual accounts. Reyes Hartley et al. (2011) use a mixed
proportional hazard rate model to analyze the Chilean account system. They compare in-
dividuals, who use the individual unemployment accounts, with individuals who in addition
also have access to the solidarity fund. They conclude that an unemployment insurance
system based on individual accounts can improve the work incentives, as individuals have
lower unemployment exit rates during the months in which they have access to the solidarity
fund than those individuals, who rely solely on their individual unemployment accounts.
Several other studies deal with the implementation of unemployment accounts in various
other countries. One important question in which these studies differ is what happens once
accounts are depleted. Can they turn negative and who pays for the negative balance? Our
design of the unemployment account system closely follows that of Brown et al. (2007), who
impose that accounts cannot turn negative. Instead, unemployed individuals with a zero
account balance receive money from the common fund to finance their unemployment bene-
fits. In this model set-up Brown et al. (2007) find that the switch from the insurance to the
account system alters employment incentives and thereby reduces the unemployment rate
of selected European countries by 30-51%. The altered employment incentives result from
a lower overall tax rate and because workers internalize their cost of unemployment (Brown
et al. (2007)). An alternative approach is modeled by Feldstein and Altman (1998), who ex-
plicitly allow negative account balances. They find that only about 5% of the employees will
end up with negative account balances at the end of their working life. Thus, even with the
possibility of negative accounts, the system is financially feasible: the cost of these negative
balances correspond to 40% of the cost of the traditional insurance system. Sorensen et al.
(2006) model the implementation of individual savings accounts in Denmark. They extend
the account concept beyond unemployment accounts and include early retirement benefits,
education benefits, sickness benefits, child benefits and parental leave benefits in addition to
short-term unemployment benefits. Their set-up also allows for negative account balances,
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which will be set to zero at the time of retirement. They also conclude that the individual
savings accounts are self-financing and improve the government budget. Furthermore, they
find that introducing individual savings accounts in Denmark will be a Pareto-improvement
despite a small increase in the inequality of the lifetime income distribution.4
The models described above are a first step to evaluating the welfare gains from replacing
the current insurance system with unemployment accounts. Nevertheless, they exhibit
some drawbacks. E.g. Feldstein and Altman (1998) disregard any behavioral responses
to the introduction of individual accounts. This constitutes a major limitation, since one
interesting question is precisely whether the unemployment account system induces changes
in labor market participation. The importance of this aspect is pointed out in Sorensen et
al. (2006), who take the behavioral component into account. They find that the behavioral
change in the labour supply due to reduced marginal and average effective labour-income
tax rates alone covers 75% of the initial revenue loss from the introduction of the accounts.
Sorensen et al. (2006) as well as Brown et al. (2007) apply a two-period model and find
improved incentives of the unemployed and a reduction in the unemployment rate in one
period (the second period) of their model. However, models with such a short time horizon
can generally not capture major dynamic effects of an unemployment reform and thus
do no exploit the full potential of an unemployment account system. We depart from
assuming a short time horizon by extending the number of periods. This enables us to
investigate whether the change in incentives to work, in the government budget and in the
unemployment rate impacts various age cohorts differently. Moreover, introducing multiple
periods is necessary in order to implement a transition phase in which the switch from the
current to the new account system can be modeled, an analysis which we perform in the
next chapter.
To our knowledge Setty (2011) and Pallage and Zimmermann (2011) are so far the
only studies that have studied unemployment accounts with an extended total number of
4Several studies consider different aspects or variants of individual welfare accounts. Those include for
instance, unemployment savings accounts in Goerke (2007); Brunner and Colarelli (2004); Vodopivec (2008),
guidelines for the practical implementation of unemployment accounts in Germany in Boss et al. (2007) or
the behavioral effects of unemployment accounts in van Huizen and Platenga (2011). Moreover, Stiglitz
and Yun (2005), Orszag et al. (1999) as well as Fo¨lster and Trofimov (1999) investigate individual account
systems, in which old-age pensions and unemployment accounts are combined. Other types of welfare
accounts, such as health and educational accounts, are for instance addressed in Fo¨lster et al. (2003).
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decision periods. Setty (2011) uses a finite horizon life-cycle model to analyze the welfare
effects of replacing the unemployment insurance with unemployment accounts. He finds
that a switch to the unemployment account system will lead to a significant welfare gain
when the employment incentives are a driving force of the model. When frictions are the
sole cause of unemployment, the switch to the account system will result in a welfare loss.
In Setty (2011) unemployment is driven by both exogenous and endogenous factors. The
exogenous factors are the age-dependent firing rate and hiring rate (search frictions). The
endogenous factors are worker’s labor choice decisions. Setty (2011) also models explicitly
a stock of wealth which is not included by Pallage and Zimmermann (2011). Pallage and
Zimmermann (2011) use an infinite horizon model with heterogenous employment status
to determine the optimal account policy. They compare this to the optimal unemployment
insurance policy and a system with self-insurance and investigate the willigness to switch
from the traditional insurance system to the account system. They find that even in the
absence of moral hazard, e.g. receiving unemployment benefits after refusing a job offer
the majority of the individuals (97%) prefer to switch to the account system. This effect is
reinforced when moral hazard is introduced; the account system is then welfare-improving.
Our methodology is similar to that of Setty (2011) and Pallage and Zimmermann (2011)
who formulate the individual’s life-cycle optimization problem as a dynamic programming
problem, which they solve numerically using advanced state of the art computational meth-
ods. However, in both these studies labor choice is binary, i.e. workers who are offered a
job have the option to accept or reject the job offer. Similarly, employed workers have the
choice to either retain their job or to quit. Our model departs from these binary decisions
in that we allow workers to make continuous-variable decisions regarding their labor effort.
This is a very important feature of our model, since we are interested in the behavioral
component of the unemployment account system and continuous decision rules allow us to
study labor individuals’ labor market incentives in much more detail. More specifically, our
major focus is to study how the trade-off between labor market incentives, consumption
and savings is affected under a system of unemployment accounts.
Indeed, our results suggest that there are enormous positive effects of introducing the
unemployment account system. First, we study a system of unemployment accounts with
only one payout period upon retirement. For the aggregate economy, we find that aggregate
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savings as well as consumption patterns are generally higher compared to the unemployment
insurance system. This results from a much higher aggregate disposable income caused by
the reduced aggregate unemployment rate. The latter is reduced by approximately 23%.
In general, switching to the unemployment account system generates stronger labor market
incentives and a reduced unemployment rate for all age groups, but is most effective at
reducing old-age unemployment. Most interestingly, those incentives are not only visible
shortly before the retirement period but already some decades in advance. When looking at
the results on the individual level, we observe, that even in the case of a zero unemployment
account balance, the individual’s leisure choice is about 10% - 15% less when compared to
the UI system. This is a strong argument for the effectiveness of unemployment accounts
in generating labor market incentives. Looking closer at the heterogeneity of individuals,
we find that independent of their age, wealthier individuals react more strongly to the
introduction of accounts, meaning that their leisure choice drops more. Finally, consumption
levels are much higher under the UA system for all individuals, irrespective of their age,
wealth or employment status.
In a next step we introduce a mechanism in order to stimulate labor market incentives
of the younger generations and study the sensitivity of the behavioral patterns to multiple
payout periods. We find, that additional payout periods strongly amplify the individuals’
labor market incentives. E.g., individuals react to the additional payouts well in advance
and adjust their behavior accordingly: they raise employment incentives to increase the
probability of employment and consequently of receiving the payout.
Finally, we focus on the welfare implications of the unemployment account system. We
find that the government budget position is improved, even in the case with multiple payout
periods. This implies, that such a change in the unemployment system is also financially
feasible. The major driver for the improved government budget is the drastically reduced
unemployment rate, which in turn leads to much lower obligations for the government of
financing unemployment benefits. Overall, the government has to pay for about two-third
of the unemployment benefits under the unemployment account system. For a coherent
welfare analysis, we also have to take into account that higher labor market incentives
actually might be welfare-reducing from the individual’s perspective, since leisure is part of
the worker’s utility. For that reason, we study the corresponding consumption equivalent
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under the unemployment account system. In general, upon entering the labor market all
individuals, whether initially employed or unemployed, rich or poor can expect higher total
welfare under any UA regime compared to the traditional UI regime. Moreover, we find
that poor individuals experience a larger welfare gain in the unemployment account system
than rich individuals, amounting up to 1%.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes the dynamic optimization model
and its computational solution method. Section 3.3 presents the results of the model. Here,
we focus on some aggregate features of the model as well as the behavioral features of
unemployment accounts. Furthermore, we study the sensitivity of our results with respect
to multiple payout periods and also perform a general welfare analysis of the unemployment
account system. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Stochastic Life Cycle and Unemployment Accounts
As already mentioned, we are particularly interested in the individual’s behavioral charac-
teristics of the unemployment account system. Therefore, we require an explicit formulation
of incentives and disincentives for labor. We therefore model the choice of leisure and shirk-
ing of the individual as continuous control variables rather than binary discrete choices.
This allows us to add an additional, incentive-dependent component to the standard fric-
tions in specifying the probability of changes in the labor market status of the individual.
Furthermore, we are interested in how these employment incentives interfere with optimal
consumption and savings decisions. Therefore, we model a stock of wealth in addition to the
stock of the unemployment account. Overall, given the different age groups, employment
status, wealth status and unemployment account level, we implement a significant degree
of heterogeneity into our model, which eventually allows us to study how the introduction
of a system of unemployment accounts will affect a wide range of individuals.
3.2.1 Structure of the Model
An individual of age t is endowed with asset holdings Xt and unemployment account balance
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At. Given the employment status St, the individual chooses consumption c and leisure
5 l to
maximize the expected present discounted life-time utility stream up to t = T . Utility in
state S is given by USt(cStt , l
St
t ) with U
St
c > 0, U
St
cc < 0, U
St
l > 0, U
St
ll < 0 and U
St
cl > 0. We
specify t ∈ [18, 19, 20, . . . 64] as the age of an individual participating in the labor market,
where age 65 corresponds to the retirement period. Thus, we have 47 periods with annual
time steps. The objective function of the individual can be expressed by:
Vt(Xt, At, St, t) = max
c
St
t ,l
St
t
E
{
T∑
t
βt−1uSt(cStt , l
St
t ) + β
T+1Ω(XT+1, AT+1)
}
s.t. Xt+1 =

(1 + r)Xt + wt(1− τAt )− cEt for St = E
(1 + r)Xt + bt − cUt for St = U
At+1 =

(1 + r)At + wtτ
A
t for St = E
max{0, (1 + r)At − bt} for St = U
St+1 = Πt(St, l
St
t )
Xt, At ≥ 0 cStt ≥ 0 0 ≤ lStt ≤ 1 (3.1)
The discount rate is denoted by β and r is the interest rate. The individual leaves the
labor market (retires) at T + 1 and has a bequest value given by the bequest function
Ω. If employed, the individual receives a wage wt and deducts an obligatory contribution
τAt wt to the individual’s unemployment account. Asset holdings, Xt, of an employed thus
increase with interest earned and net wage. They decrease with higher consumption levels.
If unemployed, the individual receives a benefit bt. Asset holdings of an unemployed increase
with interest earned and the benefit. They decrease with higher consumption levels. The
unemployment account level of the employed increases each period with interest earned and
the obligatory contribution. In case of unemployment, the unemployment account is used
to cover the benefit. However, once the UA balance becomes insufficient, the government
5Leisure can be seen as on-the-job shirking if employed and job search disincentives if unemployed.
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steps in to cover for the remainder. The employment status St is a binary Markov chain
with two possible values, E when employed and U when unemployed. The Markov chain
transition matrix from St to St+1 is given by:
Πt =
 piEE(lEt ) piEU (lEt )
piUE(l
U
t ) piUU (l
U
t )
 . (3.2)
Thus, given a leisure level lUt of the unemployed, the probability of finding a job is piUE(l
U
t )
and the probability of staying unemployed is piUU (l
U
t ) = 1 − piUE(lUt ). Similarly, given
a shirking level lEt of the employed, the probability of loosing a job is piEU (l
E
t ) and the
probability of keeping a job is piEE(l
E
t ) = 1 − piEU (lEt ). Figure 3.1 summarizes the model
structure.
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Figure 3.1: Stochastic model structure: Time runs from 1− T . Each time period, the welfare-maximizing
individual faces an endowment of assets X and an unemployment account balance A on the continuous
state space X − A. When employed, the individual receives wage wEt , net of τAt , the contribution to the
unemployment account. The optimal consumption cEt and leisure l
E
t policies conditional on the X − A
endowment determine the value function V Et . The same logic holds for the unemployed individual who
receives unemployment benefits bUt . Given the employment status St ∈ [E,U ], the individual’s leisure-
dependent probability of moving to state St+1 ∈ [E,U ] is given by piStSt+1(lStt ). At time T , the individual
faces a terminal value function. It is important to note, that given T time periods the model generates 2T
possible employment paths. The paths are not interlinked. Assuming T = 48, we obtain 2.81474977 · 1014
possible employment paths. Since X and A are modeled as continuous-state variables, we are able to
determine the optimal consumption and leisure decisions given the age and employment status for an infinite
number of combination in the X −A space.
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3.2.2 The Dynamic Programming Framework
A solution to the dynamic optimization problem in (3.1) satisfies the Bellman equations for
the employed (E) and unemployed (U) at each time period. We assume that the individual
leaves the labor market at t = T + 1. As a consequence, the terminal value function is
known and equal to the bequest value
VT+1(XT+1, AT+1) = Ω(XT+1, AT+1) (3.3)
Given 3.3 we can recursively solve 3.1 for t = T . . . 1. In particular, we solve the Bellman
equation for the individual when employed at t:
V Et = max
cEt ,l
E
t
uE(cEt , l
E
t ) (3.4)
+ β · (piEE(lEt ) · V Et+1(XEt+1, AEt+1) + piEU (lEt ) · V Ut+1(XUt+1, AUt+1))
s.t. cEt ≥ 0
0 ≤ lEt ≤ 1
At+1 = max{0, (1 + r)AEt + wtτAt }
XEt ≥ 0
Xt+1 = (1 + r)X
E
t + wt(1− τAt )− cEt
where XE1 and A
E
1 are given. Similarly, we solve the Bellman equation for the individual
when unemployed at t:
V Ut = max
cUt ,l
U
t
uU (cUt , l
U
t ) (3.5)
+ β · (piUU (lUt ) · V Ut+1(XUt+1, AUt+1) + piUE(lUt ) · V Et+1(XEt+1, AEt+1))
s.t. cUt ≥ 0
0 ≤ lUt ≤ 1
At+1 = max{0, (1 + r)AUt − bt}
XUt ≥ 0
Xt+1 = (1 + r) ·XUt + bt − cUt
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where XU1 and A
U
1 are given.
In a next step we derive the optimality conditions for the optimal consumption and
leisure policy. The first-order condition with respect to optimal consumption for the em-
ployed is given by:
∂uEt
∂cEt
= −β
(
piEE(l
E
t )
∂V Et+1
∂Xt+1
∂Xt+1
∂cEt
+ piEU (l
E
t )
∂V Ut+1
∂Xt+1
∂Xt+1
∂cEt
)
(3.6)
= β
(
piEE(l
E
t )
∂V Et+1
∂Xt+1
+ piEU (l
E
t )
∂V Ut+1
∂Xt+1
)
Thus, the employed consumes up to the point at which the marginal utility gain equals
the expected present-discounted next period’s marginal value function. Similarly, the Euler
equation of the unemployed implies an inter-temporal consumption tradeoff. Todays ad-
ditional utility obtained from consuming the marginal unit of assets comes at the costs of
forgone utility reward from higher asset holdings tomorrow.
∂uUt
∂cUt
= −β
(
piUU (l
U
t )
∂V Ut+1
∂Xt+1
∂Xt+1
∂cUt
+ piUE(l
U
t )
∂V Et+1
∂Xt+1
∂Xt+1
∂cUt
)
(3.7)
= β
(
piUU (l
U
t )
∂V Ut+1
∂Xt+1
+ piUE(l
U
t )
∂V Et+1
∂Xt+1
)
Equations 3.8 and 3.9 specify the Euler equations for the optimal leisure choice. From Equa-
tion 3.8 we deduct that the optimal leisure choice for the employed is one that equates the
marginal utility of leisure to the present-value additional reward of employment, weighted
by the marginal firing rate6.
∂uEt
∂lEt
= −β
( <0︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂piEE
∂lEt︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
V Et+1 +
∂piEU
∂lEt︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
V Ut+1
)
(3.8)
= β
∂piEU
∂lEt
(V Et+1 − V Ut+1)
6Note, that because piEE = 1− piEU , it holds that ∂piEE∂lEt = −
∂piEU
∂lEt
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A similar logic holds for the unemployed. Today, the unemployed will choose leisure up to
that level for which today’s marginal utility gains are offset by today’s value of the expected
additional reward from tomorrow’s employment status.
∂uUt
∂lUt
= −β
( <0︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂piUU
∂lUt︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
V Ut+1 +
∂piUE
∂lUt︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
V Et+1
)
(3.9)
= β
∂piUE
∂lUt
(V Et+1 − V Ut+1)
In general, the individual therefore must trade off the instantaneous benefits of leisure
agains the discounted, uncertain future welfare from changes in the employment status. In
the following we want to shed more light on those behavioral trade offs. Unfortunately,
the multidimensional structure of our model does not allow for a closed form solution. We
therefore use computational methods to numerically approximate a solution to the model.
3.2.3 The Numerical Solution Method
Our optimization problem is to solve a stochastic non-linear finite horizon model. We have
two continuous states (assets and unemployment accounts) and a discrete employment state
variable. We also have two continuous control variables (consumption and leisure choice).
We solve this problem recursively, starting from the terminal period. In each period we
compute the value function by maximizing over optimal consumption and leisure decisions
for the individuals. We approximate the value function by a multidimensional polynomial
over a finite interval of the state space. This is a standard approach in computational
economics. We then iterate backwards up to the initial time period and proceed at each
time step in the same manner. Furthermore, in many economic problems, the value function
usually exhibits smoothness and sometimes monotonicity. When it is possible the modeler
should exploit those properties to reduce the clock time of the optimization algorithm and
increase accuracy of the model solution. In our case, given the properties of the utility
function, it is natural to assume monotonicity and concavity of the value function with
respect to the stock of wealth. Algorithm 2 below describes our numerical approach in
more detail.
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Algorithm 2 - Shape-Preserving Numerical Dynamic Programming Algorithm
Numerical dynamic programming algorithm for solving the stochastic finite horizon opti-
mization problem with value function iteration
(Initialization phase)
Step 1. For both continuous state variables Xt and At, define a grid of approximation
nodes, Xt = {xit : 1 ≤ i ≤ mt} and At = {ajt : 1 ≤ j ≤ nt} ∀t < T
Step 2. Express V˜ st (X
s
t , A
s
t ) as a sum of (k − 1)th degree Chebyshev polynomials (P) over
Xs and As, with k2 coefficients, i.e.: V˜ st (X
s
t , A
s
t ) =
∑k
i=0
∑k
j=0 φi,jPi(X
s)Pj(A
s). Let
V˜T+1(XT+1, AT+1) = Ω(XT+1, AT+1).
Step 3. Recursively iterate from t = T . . . t = 1 over steps 4 and 5.
(Maximization phase)
Step 4 Calculate the value function and optimal consumption and leisure policy functions
for the employed (E) and unemployed (U) for each t and
V˜ Et (X
E
t , A
E
t ) = max
cEt ,l
E
t
uE(cEt , l
E
t )
+ β · (piEE(lEt )V˜ Et+1(XEt+1, AEt+1) + piEU (lEt )V˜ Ut+1(XUt+1, AUt+1))
V˜ Ut (X
U
t , A
U
t ) = max
cUt ,l
U
t
uU (cUt , l
U
t )
+ β · (piUU (lUt )V˜ Ut+1(XUt+1, AUt+1) + piUE(lUt )V˜ Et+1(XEt+1, AEt+1))
(Shape-preserving approximation phase)
Step 5. Given the maximization data from step 4 use the L2 norm with shape preservation
constraints on the value function to approximate the optimal value function.
For the implementation of the algorithm we need to specify functional forms and parameters
of our model. The following section provides more information on that task. We code the
51
model and the algorithm in AMPL and use KNITRO as the nonlinear optimization solver.
It takes about one minute to solve the model using a 2 GH, Intel Core i7 machine with 8GB
RAM. The resulting relative errors of the approximation are all at most 10−6.
3.3 Results of the Optimization Problem
The relatively simple structure of our model prevents extensive calibrations. Neverthe-
less, we calibrate our model in accordance with the relevant literature and to match to
the German economy. More precisely, we perform a polynomial approximation to fit
the life-cycle wage profile of the synthetic data from our empirical analysis of Chapter
2. In addition, we assume that bt = b¯wt−1 with b¯ = 0.6, i.e. the individual’s unemploy-
ment benefit amounts to 60% of the last period’s wage. The utility function is given by
u(ct, lt) = (c
α
t l
1−α)1−γ/(1−γ). We assume α = 0.925 and γ = 1.5. Furthermore, as already
suggested in the previous section, we model the bequest function (i.e., the terminal value
function ) as Ω(XT+1, AT+1) = ((1 + r)(XT+1 + AT+1))
α(1−γ)/(1 − γ), assuming that all
available assets are consumed and leisure is equal to 1. We assume that both, the market
interest rate r and the annual discount rate β are 4%7. The individual’s contribution to the
unemployment account is 2% of the wage. Finally, our calibrated endogenous firing and hir-
ing rate are given by piEU = (1 + e
−νE(lE−λE)))−1 and by piUE = (1 + e−ν
U (lU−λU )))−1, with
νE = 10, λE = 0.4, νU = 6 and λU = 0.5. Thus, our logistic firing and hiring functions are
projected around the linear ones in Brown et al. (2007). Note, that λE and λU denote those
leisure choices, which result in the highest marginal firing and hiring rates, respectively.
After implementing these functional forms and calibrated parameter choices, we apply
Algorithm 2 to the equation system (3.4) and (3.5) to numerically compute the solution to
the workers’ optimization problem. After solving the optimization problem, we run 100,000
Monte Carlo runs to simulate the life cycles of the individuals. In the following we present
the results of those simulations. First, we study the aggregate of all simulations. Second,
7van Huizen and Platenga (2011) note that the discount rate may be much higher, which implies a lower
present value of the final payout and therefore a lower effect on incentives. Our assumption of exponential
discounting also implies that all individuals have the same time-consistent preferences. As mentioned in
van Huizen and Platenga (2011) the effect of the unemployment account system may be overestimated if
this is not the case and some individuals are more myopic than others. Implementing (quasi-)hyperbolic
preferences may be one way to address this issue in the future.
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we focus on the individual’s behavioral characteristics. Third, we modify the underlying
model to allow for multiple payout periods. Finally, we perform a welfare analysis of the
models.
3.3.1 Aggregate Features of the Model’s Solution
We study the effects of replacing the traditional unemployment insurance system with in-
dividual unemployment accounts. We put special focus on the behavioral analysis of the
individual’s optimal consumption and leisure choices. However, in order to facilitate that
analysis, we want to highlight how the model’s calibration translates into the aggregate
character of the simulated economy. Therefore, this section shows how the average unem-
ployment account develops over time, and which level of payout can be expected by an
individual upon retirement. Furthermore, we present the results on the consumption and
saving behavior over the lifetime of the individuals under both systems.
Figure 3.2 shows some aggregate characteristics over the life cycle of individuals. First,
note that (net) wage and unemployment benefits, as calibrated, are hump-shaped with a
peak in the late forties of an individual. Next, consider the shaded area in Figure 3.2
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Figure 3.2: Aggregate Variables Under the UA System Over the Life Cycle: Results of
100.000 Simulated Individuals. One Unit of Vertical Axis = e10,000.
which represents the possible set of unemployment account holdings. Obviously, the lower
envelope is zero, implying that out of the 100,000 simulated life cycles, there will always
be someone in each age cohort having zero unemployment account holdings. The upper
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envelope represents the unemployment account of an individual, who is always employed.
Naturally, the unemployment account for that individual will be convexly shaped due to
compounding. We note, that the maximum unemployment account level upon retirement
is about twice the corresponding wage level 8.
Also note, that a 43-year old individual, who has always been employed, will face an
unemployment account level being equal to the expected unemployment benefit in case of
unemployment. Similarly, a 51-year old individual, who has always been employed, will
face an unemployment account level being roughly equal to the the wage. This is a direct
consequence of the 2% mandatory contribution to the unemployment account and the 4%
annual interest rate in our model. Consider next the evolution of the average individual’s
unemployment account level. Recall, that individuals start out with zero account holdings.
Over the life cycle, only if employed, individuals transfer money to their unemployment
accounts. The average account balance is increasing over the lifetime of the individual.
Note however, that while the average account holdings are about 50% of the maximum
possible level for a 33-year old, the average retiree can expect only about one sixth of the
maximum possible account level. This is simply due to the fact that the probability of
being unemployed at least once is increasing with age. Recall, that any individual who
becomes unemployed before age 43 will face an unemployment account level dropping to
zero. Nevertheless, the average payout upon retirement is about 40% of the last period’s
wage.
In a next step, we consider the optimal average consumption choice. The individual
faces an inter-temporal consumption trade-off. On the one hand, discounting puts pressure
on consuming more in early years. On the other hand, both, risk aversion and the inter-
temporal elasticity of substitution induce the individual to consume more in later years,
leading to consumption smoothing over the life cycle. Consequently, less consumption
today (with higher asset holdings tomorrow) serves as an insurance against the state of
unemployment and low income. In Figure 3.2 we see, that the average young individual
consumes almost the entire disposable income (i.e. wage - UA contribution). Therefore,
savings build up only slowly. Up to age 30, the stock of savings is still less than the average
8In accordance with our calibration, 1 unit = e10,000.
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UA holdings. After age 30, savings continuously increase and peak at about age 58. Even
upon retirement savings constitute a considerably high share of last period’s wage. This is
expected since the individual does not receive any labor income upon retirement and the risk
of a low unemployment account level upon retirement induce the individual to accumulate
this high level of savings. Furthermore, consumption smoothing preferences of the individual
amplify this effect. The latter argument also explains why the average consumption path is
more smooth than the wage path. In general, both average consumption and asset holdings
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Figure 3.3: UA vs. UI - Asset Holdings (Total Savings) and Consumption. 100.000 Runs
exhibit intuitive profiles. Nevertheless, we can expect to observe some impact on the optimal
consumption-saving decision when switching to the UA system. This is the focus of analysis
in Figure 3.3. According to the left plot, the average savings (asset holdings) under the
UA system are significantly higher compared to the UI system9. This effect amounts up
to 15%-20% over almost the entire life cycle. At the same time, the average consumption
level under the UA system is generally higher than under the UI system, as we show in the
right plot. Thus, the UA system, despite leading to higher consumption for the average
individual, does not crowd out aggregate savings. On the contrary, the savings behavior
of the average individual is significantly enhanced. At first sight, higher consumption and
higher savings appear counterintuitive. However, note that both plots represent the nominal
9Any comparison between these two systems in this chapter disregards any transition phase. Thus, the
UA system results represent a situation in which all simulated individuals have always lived under the UA
system. We will study transitional effects in the following chapter.
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levels for the average individual. Thus, the only possible driver of this result must be a
significantly higher degree of disposable income. That in turn can only be obtained by a
significantly lower unemployment rate under the UA system. In order to shed more light at
this finding, we consider next how the optimal leisure choice evolves over the life cycle and
how that affects the prospects of employment. The left part of Figure 3.4 describes the
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Figure 3.4: UA vs. UI - Labor Market Incentives. 100.000 Runs
optimal dynamics of leisure choice under the UA system in comparison to the UI system.
In the traditional unemployment insurance model the optimal leisure choice is an increasing
function of age. This mainly occurs for two reasons. On the one hand, wages rise constantly
until the last third of the life cycle, which increases consumption and eventually the marginal
utility of leisure. After about age 55 wages start to fall slowly. Nevertheless, leisure is still
increasing. This is due to the reduced threat of unemployment persistence towards the end
of the working life. On the other hand, the possible impacts of unemployment persistence
on the individual’s welfare fade with higher age of the individual. Furthermore, note that
under the UI system, at age 63, there is a sudden sharp increase in leisure. While not
shown here in more detail, this result arises because the rich 63-year old face much higher
marginal welfare returns from increasing leisure than increasing consumption. Their leisure
choice is very high while the poor 63-year old do not face such a strong rise in leisure. As
a consequence, the average leisure choice exhibits some of the sharp rise.
This effect is mainly due to the fact that the rich employed face much higher marginal
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welfare returns from increasing leisure than increasing consumption10. In contrast, the
unemployment account system induces the individuals to drastically change their leisure
choice. While the leisure choice is always lower than in the UI system throughout their entire
working life, the average optimal leisure choice is inversely U-shaped over the life cycle with
a peak at age 33. This increasing part of the leisure path is most likely attributed to the
wage level which is rising. Most interestingly, when considering that the wage profile peaks
only after age 45 (see Figure 3.2 ), leisure decreases after age 33 - much earlier than the wage
rate. Clearly the prospect of the payout from the unemployment account upon retirement
drives this behavior. In anticipation of the significantly high payout upon retirement the
average individual exhibits much stronger employment incentives than under the UI system.
Those incentives are not only visible shortly before the retirement period but already some
decades in advance.
The right plot in Figure 3.4 depicts how the UA system relatively affects aggregate labor
market incentives. We find that the UA system clearly leads to higher aggregate working
incentives over the entire life cycle. Furthermore, that difference increases monotonically
as the individuals approach the retirement age and ultimately the unemployment account
payout. Nevertheless, even entrants to the labor market (i.e. 18-years old) have on average
about 2% higher labor market incentives.
We have argued before that higher consumption and higher savings can only be attained
if the aggregate unemployment rate under the UA system is reduced. Recall that we model a
direct relationship between labor market incentives and the unemployment rate, i.e., higher
leisure increases the expected firing rate and decreases the expected hiring rate. Therefore,
following our findings from Figure 3.4, we expect the unemployment rate to fall in the UA
system. Figure 3.5 confirms our expectation. It shows that the unemployment rates in the
two systems diverge significantly with the age of the cohorts. During the lifetime of the
individuals in the UI system, the unemployment rate shows an upward trend, rising by more
than 40% in total11.
10Note, that we omit showing the leisure at age 64, which is the last decision stage in the model. At age 64
all individuals choose leisure of 1.
11In Figure 3.5 we aim at presenting a rough aggregate trend and therefore perform a third-order polynomial
interpolation on the actual results to facilitate visualizing that trend.
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This feature relates back to the increasing leisure path over the life cycle. In fact, both
variables exhibit a direct proportional link. In particular, as we have explained above,
workers in the UI system, who are close to the retirement age, value leisure relatively more
than expected consumption flows. This effect is completely offset under the UA system.
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Figure 3.5: Average Unemployment Rate in Both Systems: Results of 10.000 Simulated
Individuals.
Switching to the unemployment account system reduces the unemployment rate significantly
for all age groups. We find that the unemployment rate roughly follows the wage profile
over the life cycle (marginal utility of leisure rises with higher consumption). The average
individual has much stronger incentives to work towards the retirement age. Clearly, the
UA system is very effective in generating these incentives and, in particular, in reducing
old-age unemployment. The unemployment rate of the entire working-age population is
shown in Table 3.112.
UI System UA System
10.46% 8.5%
Table 3.1: Demographically-Weighted Unemployment Rate of Working-Age Population
12We have computed the unemployment rates in Table 3.1 by aggregating the age-dependent unemployment
rates and applying the 2004 demographic distribution in Germany.
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First, as a result of our 100,000 simulated life cycles, the total unemployment rate under
the UI system is 10.46%. This result matches very well the average unemployment rate
for Germany between 1996-2004. We consider this match as validating our calibration of
the wage profile and the hiring and firing rates. By contrast, a complete switch to the UA
system drastically reduces the total unemployment rate. The nominal reduction is almost
two percentage points and relatively, the unemployment rate is reduced by approximately
23%.
In general, the unemployment account system has a tremendous effect on the labor
market prospects of all individuals. We attribute the increase in labor market incentives
and the accompanying reduction in unemployment clearly to the expected payout upon
retirement under the UA system. However, a payout at age 65 constitutes a stochastic
cash flow of unknown size and it seems questionable if this stochastic cash flow can be that
effective. Nevertheless, the risk of the expected return upon retirement is partly endogenous,
since it can be altered by individual leisure choice. In the following, we shed more light on the
payout of the individuals and highlight some statistical results for the level of unemployment
accounts over the 100,000 simulations.
Table 3.2 provides details on the development of the account balances according to
income deciles13. The unemployment account balance upon retirement as share of last pe-
riod’s wage differs enormously across the income distribution. It ranges from 14% in the
lowest decile to 165% in the top decile. Obviously, individuals located in the upper part of
the income distribution have been unemployed fewer times than the poor individuals. Ac-
cordingly, their accumulated account balance is much higher. Nevertheless, even the lowest
decile, which primarily includes individuals who have been most frequently unemployed, can
still - on average- expect an additional payout of about 14% of their wage before retirement.
Next, we consider the share of self-financed transfers over the life cycle. One of the moti-
vations for reforming the unemployment system via introducing unemployment accounts is
to take advantage of the high extent of intrapersonal income redistribution. Therefore, the
share of self-financed transfers shows whether the model lives up to our primary motivation.
13We compute the deciles based on lifetime income, which we define as the the sum of wage and benefits.
We disregard here the final payout that the individual receives upon retirement.
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D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10
UA Balance upon Retirement 0.14 0.18 0.21 0.26 0.27 0.34 0.40 0.64 0.79 1.65
(as Share of Last Period’s Wage)
Self-Financed Transfers 0.16 0.22 0.26 0.29 0.34 0.37 0.47 0.49 0.59 0.62
(Share)
Positive Account Balances upon Retirement 0.86 0.89 0.91 0.93 0.93 0.95 0.97 1 1 1
(Share)
Positive Account Balances during Lifetime 0.84 0.87 0.89 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.99
(Share)
Positive Account Balances during Lifetime 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.13 0.21 0.27 0.45
(Share of Average Transfer)
Table 3.2: Account Balances, Self-Financed Transfers and Positive Account Balances by
Deciles of Lifetime Income.
Self-financed transfers are a measure of how effective unemployment accounts cover unem-
ployment benefits. Obviously, frequently unemployed individuals who do not accumulate
large stocks of unemployment accounts cannot cover their unemployment benefits entirely.
Our results suggest that the share of self-financed transfers over the life cycle is about 16%
for the poorest, and most frequently unemployed ones. It gradually rises up to 62% on
average for the highest deciles. In addition, note that the extent to which the unemploy-
ment transfer is self-financed is also affected by the timing of the unemployment status.
Unemployment at the beginning of the working life lowers the share of self-financing even
further, as the individual has not yet accumulated enough to pay the benefit. We already
pointed out above that some individuals - even if always employed - cannot self-finance one
year of unemployment benefits until age 43. Those individuals have to rely on the govern-
ment to co-finance the unemployment transfer, as they have not accumulated enough on
their unemployment account. In contrast, a 54 year old individual who has always been
unemployed has accumulated enough account holdings to self-finance two consecutive years
of unemployment.
Table 3.2 reports also the share of positive account balances upon retirement. This share
ranges from 86% to 100% across the income distribution. It reflects the low unemployment
rate of the individuals in the last period of their working life. Here again, we observe older
individuals striving to receive the final payout. As a result, the predominant majority has a
positive account balance upon retirement. In order to reduce the weight of this final ”effort-
phase”, we also look at the share of positive account balances during the entire lifetime.
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This share is surprisingly high. Even in the lowest decile, individuals on average have a
positive account balance in about 84% of their working life. This share is close to 100% in
the last two deciles.
The previous two statistics do not provide information on the actual magnitude of the
unemployment accounts. Therefore, we look at the average unemployment benefit over the
life cycle and add the bottom row in Table 3.2 as a rough indicator for how often individuals
can completely self-finance their unemployment benefits. More precisely, the question we
ask is: If unemployed, in how many cases does an individual have enough account holdings
to cover the entire unemployment benefit? Consider, e.g. the first decile. Our model
suggests, that there is only a 1% chance that individuals will be able to completely self-
finance all unemployment spells over their life cycle. Similarly, when considering the richest
decile, we find that lifetime-rich individuals will be able to self-finance almost half of their
unemployment spells.
The general message from Table 3.2 is, that the individuals manage to accumulate
significantly large balances on their individual accounts. This is despite the fact, that they
use a large share of it in order to finance the unemployment spells during their working
life. In particular, the share of positive accounts over the lifetime and upon retirement are
indicators for the significant rewards to employment, which individuals’ can expect. These
results from our simulated economy shows that the unemployment account system is able
to generate large positive incentives to work and reduces the average unemployment rate
for all age groups. In the next section, we want to identify the major behavioral drivers
behind the individuals optimal decisions.
3.3.2 Behavioral Features of the Model’s Solution
In this section we focus on the individual’s decision making process. Recall that in our
modeling framework, the optimal choice of leisure and consumption is a function of four
state variables, the level of assets (continuous), the level of the unemployment account (con-
tinuous), the employment status (binary) and age (discrete). Given the stochastic dynamic
programing approach, we can present the optimal individual choices as either static deci-
sion rules depending on the state space, or as the dynamic evolution of the individual’s life
cycle under rational decision making. The former type of presenting results is more general,
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answering questions like ”given asset level X and account level A, how much leisure will
a 45-year old choose if employed?” The latter type of presenting results allows us to look
more closely at selected sample stochastic life cycle paths. In this section, we perform both
types of analyses.
Analysis of Selected Sample Life Cycle Paths
First, we demonstrate the interplay of the various mechanisms, which are at work in the
unemployment account system. In order to do this, we choose from our Monte Carlo
simulation one sample path of an individual, who is unemployed three times during the
working life (at age 27, 39 and age 61). We compare this individual to one who lives under
the UI system, having exactly the same employment history. The lower part of Figure 3.6
shows the optimal leisure choice for both individuals. The upper part of that figure depicts
the wage and benefits profiles, the evolution of the unemployment account under the UA
system as well as optimal consumption and asset levels under both, the UI and UA system.
The individual’s age interval which we consider is 18-6314.
Let us first consider the individual under the UI system (variables under the UI system
are depicted as rectangles). Optimal consumption is quite high and the individual does
not accumulate much assets up to age 26. Leisure between age 18 and 26 increases slightly
due to higher income and consumption levels. In the first unemployment spell at age 27
the individual sharply increases leisure to offset the significant drop in consumption. The
latter is still slightly above the unemployment benefit. Note, that this extra consumption
in excess of the benefit comes from savings. The individual consumes all savings to smooth
out the consumption path. As a consequence, savings at age 28 drop to zero. Furthermore,
since the individual is employed again at age 28, leisure is drastically reduced, even below
the former path since now the stock of asset holdings is much less. Finally, consumption is
almost back to its old path.
With the next unemployment spell occurring at age 39, the individual again chooses
much higher leisure and is forced to lower consumption once again. However, this time,
14Recall that the optimal leisure choice at age 64 is one. We do not show age-64 results to facilitate
visualization. Besides, as both individuals are employed at age 64, the state variables (asset and account
levels) can be inferred from the age-63 states and controls.
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consumption is smoothed significantly better by using approximately 50% of the savings.
Note, that the individual could afford the same constant consumption level as at age 38.
However, since asset holdings also insure against lower consumption levels in case of future
unemployment, the individual has to weigh much higher consumption at age 39 against the
probability of being unemployed again in the next periods. The obvious choice is to hedge
and not to decrease assets further.
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Figure 3.6: Two Sample Paths of Individuals With Same Employment Status over the Life
Cycle (UA vs. UI System)
Recall, that savings are the individual’s only source of income during retirement. There-
fore, we observe a sharply increasing and hump-shaped level of assets. It has to provide
enough income upon retirement and still insure against lower consumption if unemployed
until then. The third unemployment spell occurs at age 61 and again, leisure is increased
and consumption is only slightly reduced.
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Next, let us compare the same individual (unemployed at age 27, 39 and 61) who lives
under the UA system (variables under the UA system are depicted as circles) There is not
much difference between these two systems early in the working life, e.g. until the first
unemployment spell occurs at age 27. However, note that the unemployment account is
accumulating and it seems as if consumption under the UA system is a bit higher and savings
consequently a bit lower. At the same time leisure is slightly lower. At age 27 this trend
does not change and both individuals adapt quite similarly to the state of unemployment.
Furthermore, note that the unemployment account drops to zero since it does not suffice to
cover the entire unemployment benefit.
At age 39, during the second unemployment spell, the unemployment account still does
not suffice to cover the entire benefit and drops again to zero. The individual is now
on the labor market for more than 20 years and has a zero account level. At that time,
consumption and leisure follow similar trends as in the UI system although now, leisure
increases much less under the UA system in order to offset the loss in utility arising from
the drop in income. Note furthermore, that the stock of savings is visibly lower than under
the UI system, which is due to the very low but constant increase in consumption in the
past. Thus, we clearly observe that the UA system crowds out savings for this individual.
This stands in contrast to our finding from the previous section. However, the previous
section looked at the consumption-savings tradeoff of the aggregate economy whereas here
we look at the individual’s tradeoff. Clearly, the expectation of a positive unemployment
account payout upon retirement lowers the pressure for building up a large stock of assets.
Therefore, a crowding out of savings occurs. At the same time, individuals choose less
leisure to increase their chances of eventually receiving a positive payout upon retirement.
This lowers the aggregate rate of unemployment and translates to an average individual
who experiences a higher total level of assets. It is important to separate these distinct
effects.
With continuing employment in the next periods, the individual starts accumulating
savings at a very steep rate. The crowding out of savings becomes therefore even more visible
in the 50-60 age interval. We clearly observe the stock of assets accumulating much slower
under the UA system than under the UI system. During this time interval the individual
consumes slightly more than under the UI system, clearly driven by the expectation of
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additional income from the unemployment account upon retirement. Correspondingly, the
individual chooses much less leisure to increase the probability of realizing that payout.
In our example however, this is not enough since the individual becomes unemployed
at age 61. As in the previous two unemployment spells, leisure increases and assets are
used to compensate for the loss of income. This time however, the level of unemployment
account is sufficiently large to cover the entire unemployment benefit and the government
does not need to co-finance the benefit. In fact, a positive amount (about 20% of last
period’s income) is left, which is being paid out upon retirement. Note however, that the
sum of account and assets is lower under the UA system than under the UI system.
Next, we want to look at some interesting sample paths, concentrating solely on the
UA system. Figure 3.7 depicts the optimal paths of consumption, leisure, assets and un-
employment accounts for three individuals with different employment histories. We want
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Figure 3.7: Sample Paths of Individuals with Different Employment Status over the Life
Cycle
to analyze how unemployment at younger age affects the life cycle dynamics under the UA
system. One individual is always employed, another individual is unemployed at age 20
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and the third individual is unemployed at age 20 and 21. Both left-hand plots in Figure
3.7 suggest that consumption and asset holdings are hardly affected when unemployment
occurs early in the life cycle. Only towards the end of the life cycle we can eyeball a small
difference between these paths. In particular, we see that the individual with two unem-
ployment spells has a slightly higher stock of assets. This is because this individual needs
additional assets to compensate for the lower account level at retirement, when compared
to the ”always employed” individual. Note, that unemployment accounts start out from a
zero level after unemployment at age 20 and 21 and compounding effects result in the visible
difference in account sizes upon retirement. At the same time the individuals have different
optimal leisure choices in the last decade of their working lives. Leisure is a bit higher for
those with less unemployment spells because the associated account level is larger. What
counts is the expected account level upon retirement, and this is determined by the size and
the probability. It seems like the expected account level is similar in all three cases. Overall
we find that the three different individuals exhibit quite similar life cycle characteristics.
In Figure 3.8 we perform a similar analysis as above, however now with three individuals
who experience identical employment histories (always employed) up to age 59, at which
age two of them become unemployed. While one of them immediately finds employment the
other individual remains unemployed for one more period. Note, that in order to highlight
the results, we just display the paths from age 54 onwards.
Let us first consider the ”always employed” individual, who accumulates a very high
balance on his unemployment account. Consequently this reduces the pressure of building
up a high stock of assets for retirement. We therefore observe that this individual has a
high, and even convex consumption pattern towards retirement age. At the same time, the
”always employed” individual can retain a more or less constant degree of leisure.
In contrast, an individual who becomes unemployed, shortly before retirement obviously
needs to update consumption and labor market incentives accordingly. We observe that a
one-time unemployment at age 59 forces the individual to prematurely use up a large part
of assets that were meant to be consumed upon retirement. Consequently consumption
is reduced, and a low utility at that age will be partly offset by a higher leisure choice.
However, already in the following year at age 60, the individual’s behavior is driven by
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Figure 3.8: Sample Paths of Individuals with Different Employment Status over the Life
Cycle
higher labor market incentives to increase the expected payout from the unemployment
account.
These effects become more pronounced when an individual faces unemployment at both,
age 59 and 60. Note, that consumption is more than proportionally decreased when com-
pared to the one-time unemployed. Similarly, the stock of assets is drastically reduced to
dampen part of the consumption loss. Leisure is increased during the unemployment spell,
but sharply reduced at age 61 and onwards.
Figure 3.8 again confirms our intuition that individual’s decision making is based on the
expected account payout. This time, with two unemployment spells, the expected payout
is much lower, and therefore the stock of assets needs to be increased despite the general
trend of reducing assets towards retirement.
Optimal Decision Rules & Heterogeneity
In the following, we want to concentrate on optimal consumption and leisure policies with
a much stronger focus on the heterogeneity of the state space, i.e. asset, account level and
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employment status. Here, we do not show any dynamic evolution of the variables, but all
control rules are inter-temporally optimal. First, we want to revisit the finding from Figure
3.4, namely the very rapid increase in leisure at age 63 under the UI system. For that
purpose, we present Figure 3.9, which displays the optimal leisure choice of a 63-year-old
employed as a function of asset wealth. The solid line marks the optimal leisure choice
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Figure 3.9: Optimal Leisure Choice for a 63-Year Old Employed as a Function of Asset (X)
Holdings.
under the UI system. Note, that up to an asset level of about 8, the individual chooses
more leisure with rising wealth level. This is intuitive, since a higher level of assets at age
63 decreases the prospects of low consumption upon retirement two years later. However,
once the individual’s asset level is larger than 8, leisure rises sharply with higher asset levels,
eventually reaching one. The basic economic intuition behind this finding is as follows. The
63-year old individual is employed. There is only one more year of uncertain job status,
which the individual can partly influence by choosing leisure. Certainly, a rich 63-year-old
individual with only two more years of utility streams will also face a high consumption
level at age 63, and consequently a lower marginal utility. It turns out to be the case that
the individual can receive higher additional utility by increasing leisure. The latter choice
has to take into account the possible reduction in expected consumption streams at age 64
and 65 because the probability of being fired is significantly increased.
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This latter effect is completely offset under the UA system. Consider first the case in
which the 63-year-old employed individual has an unemployment account level of about the
same size as his wage (e.g. A = 3.66). With just two more years to consume, this individual
hedges consumption by choosing a much higher consumption at age 63 and taking the risk
of lower future consumption in case of unemployment at age 64. As a consequence, leisure
is much lower for the rich individual compared to the UI system. The individual chooses
less leisure because this increases the chances of obtaining the account level upon retirement
while enjoying a current higher consumption level. Next, note that for the individual who
has no funds in the unemployment account the situation is slightly different. This individual
cannot expect a high payout upon retirement. However, the sharp increase in leisure as in
the UI system does not occur. With two more years of anticipated contribution to the
unemployment account, this individual can expect a payout of about 4% of the current
wage at retirement. Given the high level of α (the consumption’s share in the utility
function), that extra 4% increase generates a higher expected utility than a drastic increase
in leisure. Thus, overall the UA system generates much stronger labor market incentives
for the old rich employed individuals. Finally, when comparing the two individuals under
the UA system, we notice that a higher unemployment account balance results in a small
parallel upward shift of the optimal leisure choice.
In the following, we want to extend the analysis of leisure and consumption choice for the
elderly, in particular taking into account the interaction between different levels of assets and
unemployment accounts. First, let us again consider the 63 year-old employed individual.
Figure 3.10 displays the optimal leisure and consumption choices of that individual as
contour plot in the asset and unemployment account space. The solid, vertical lines reflect
the fact that under the UI system unemployment accounts do not exist and therefore do
not influence the decision making process. We observe that both, optimal leisure and
consumption choices increase with higher asset levels. This result is as expected. In fact,
the equidistant contours for consumption indicate that optimal consumption is proportional
to the stock of asset. The contours for the optimal leisure choices under the UI system are
further away from each other with rising asset levels, indicating a concave relationship.
This is due to the fact, that our calibrated firing rate is convex for that low range of leisure
choices.
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Next, we study how these optimal choices are affected by the UA system. When the
level of unemployment accounts is zero, a 63-year-old employed individual chooses more
consumption than compared to the UI system. Note that each vertical contour (isoquant) of
the UI system is to the right of the corresponding isoquant of the UA system (E.g. at X = 2,
optimal consumption under the UI system is 3 while under the UA system it is strictly larger
(about 3.05). This is because even with a zero unemployment account level, the employed
individual can expect a positive account balance upon retirement. Furthermore, with
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Figure 3.10: Optimal Leisure and Consumption Choice for a 63 Year-Old Employed as a
Function of Asset and Account Holdings (X-A space).
higher levels of the unemployment account (keeping asset levels constant) that individual is
constantly increasing the optimal consumption level. See for instance at asset level of 3, an
optimal consumption rising from 3.53 to 4, with a corresponding account level of 0.5 and
2.75. This effect persists up to an unemployment account level of 4 after which it fades out.
This fading-out effect occurs in part because of the decreasing marginal rate of substitution
of leisure for consumption. The left plot for optimal leisure provides more intuition for this.
We observe, that even in the case of zero unemployment accounts, the individual’s leisure
choice is about 10%−15% less when compared to the UI system. This is a strong argument
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for the effectiveness of unemployment accounts in generating labor market incentives for
the elderly, even for those with zero account balances, and irrespective of asset wealth.
Furthermore, with higher levels of unemployment accounts (keeping assets constant),
the employed, 63-years old reduce their leisure choices even further. See for instance the
leisure choice at asset level 4, which drops from 0.18 to 0.15 with a rise in the account bal-
ance up to 3.5. Recall, that at the same time consumption is increased. Thus, consumption
is substituted for leisure, and this lower level of leisure in turn increases the probability of
more consumption upon retirement. However, we also observe that there exists a thresh-
old in the level of unemployment accounts, beyond which leisure is starting to rise again.
This corresponds to the previously noted assumption that the marginal rate of substitution
(leisure for consumption) is very low. One final observation is that the threshold in un-
employment account levels beyond which leisure is rising increases with higher asset levels.
This reflects the consumption smoothing preferences of wealthier individuals to maintain a
high level of consumption.
Let us next study the optimal control rules for a 63-years old unemployed individual.
From Figure 3.11, we note that in general at age 63, for any wealth level an unemployed
chooses more leisure and less consumption than the employed. Also, the unemployed chooses
more consumption and less leisure under the UA system. Broadly speaking, the optimal
choices for consumption and leisure are driven by the same channels as already described
for the employed. However, there is one major exception. Figure 3.11 shows that in both
plots the optimal choice of leisure and consumption is invariant to unemployment account
levels up to about 2. Recall, that the unemployed benefits are first covered by the stock
of unemployment account and the remainder (if any) is covered by the government. This
implies that the 63-year old unemployed today will, as a 64-year old, be endowed with
unemployment account level of max{0, (1 + r)AU63 − b63}15. Consequently, the 63-year old
unemployed knows that the unemployment account will be reduced with certainty. It turns
out, that the unemployment benefit is about 2 and therefore the observed kink in Figure 3.11
also occurs at that level. In fact, since this result is a direct consequence of our modeling
assumptions, we consider it as validating our numerical solution algorithm.
15where we denote A as a beginning-of-period and b as an end-of-period variable.
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Figure 3.11: Optimal Leisure and Consumption Choice for a 63-Year Old Unemployed as a
Function in Asset and Account Holdings (X-A space).
Next, we consider the optimal consumption and leisure choices for employed and unemployed
individuals in different age groups, taking into account the heterogeneity in their wealth
status. Table 3.3 reports the leisure and consumption choice of the UA system relative to
the UI system. Regarding the leisure choice, we see that the drop in leisure when switching
to the UA system is more pronounced with increasing age, confirming our findings of the
last section. This is valid for both, the unemployed as well as the employed, and also
irrespective of the wealth status of the individual. Independent of their age, wealthier
individuals react more strongly to the introduction of accounts, meaning that their leisure
choice drops more. They have the financial power to consume more while at the same
time reducing leisure to increase the probability of receiving their unemployment account.
This effect is most valid for the very young. Focusing on the distinction in the behavior of
unemployed and employed individuals, Table 3.3 shows, that young unemployed individuals
(aged 18) reduce their leisure more than the employed in the account system. In contrast,
middle-aged individuals reduce their leisure more strongly when they are employed, and at
age 62, the reduction in leisure is more or less the same for both, employed and unemployed
individuals.
Regarding the optimal consumption choice, Table 3.3 shows that the consumption level
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Control Variable: leisure consumption
Employment Status: unemployed employed unemployed employed
poor -0.014 -0.012 +0.004 +0.005
Age = 18
rich -0.025 -0.019 +0.009 +0.011
poor -0.054 -0.089 +0.012 +0.022
Age = 40
rich -0.058 -0.092 +0.027 +0.032
poor -0.282 -0.268 +0.172 +0.282
Age = 62
rich -0.285 -0.288 +0.076 +0.191
Table 3.3: Optimal Consumption and Leisure Choices under the UA system, Relative to
the UI System
is much higher under the UA system for all individuals, irrespective of their age, wealth or
employment status. However, as in the case of the optimal leisure decision, the impact on
consumption is more pronounced, the older the individuals. To give an example, a rich 62
year-old employed individual increases his consumption level by 19.1%, while a rich young
individual increase his consumption only by 1.1%. Moreover, we see that when moving to
the UA system, employed individuals enjoy a higher increase in consumption levels than
unemployed individuals. This holds even when we take their wealth status into account. For
instance, poor middle-aged individuals will increase their consumption nearly twice as much
in the UA system as poor middle-aged unemployed. The wealth level affects the difference
in optimal consumption choices positively, with the exception of older individuals. In the
latter case, wealthier individuals increase their consumption less than poorer individuals,
which is simply due to the fact, that old rich individuals choose to have much leisure which
increases the marginal utility of consumption.
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3.4 Extension - Multiple Payout Periods
The previous section discussed the results for the basic model, in which one single payout of
the unemployment account occurs upon retirement. The results showed that the incentives
to work increased over the whole lifetime of all individuals. Comparing the incentives to
work for different age groups we found, that this effect was not uniformly distributed over
all age groups. Instead, the incentives to work - depicted by the leisure decision - increased
particularly for the older individuals. Consequently, the question arises whether there is
an alternative mechanism to increase the incentives to work of the younger generations,
without at the same time compromising the beneficial effect for the elderly. We explore
this question by implementing an earlier payout timing in the model. In particular, our
objective in this section is to investigate how the duration until the payout period affects
the incentives to work of different age groups.
We study two cases, in which we allow for additional payouts. In both cases these
payouts occur earlier, that is they occur during the working life of the individuals. We
compare those cases to our baseline scenario with one single payout upon retirement (case
1). In case 2, we allow for two payouts: one occurs upon retirement with age 65 (as in the
previous section), the other payout occurs already after 20 years in the job market (at age
37). In case 3, we allow for 5 payouts, which roughly occur every ten years (with age 27,
37, 47, 57, 65). We compare both cases with the results from the previous section, in which
the only payout occurred upon retirement.
There are many different ways in which such a payout can be designed. In addition
to the timing of the payouts, it is necessary to make some assumptions about the share of
the account balance that is withdrawn by the individuals. In order to clearly identify the
new impact of the additional payout periods, we assume that the individuals receive the full
account balance at each payout period, that has been accumulated up to date. Furthermore,
we assume that all individuals (who have money on their accounts) receive the payout. If
they had the choice whether or not to receive the payout, all individuals would choose the
certain payout, instead of leaving the money on the account. Otherwise, the money on the
account could be ”lost” in case of unemployment.
In the following we describe the adjusted optimization problem for both cases. The
dynamic stochastic optimization model for an individual under the UA system with multiple
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payout periods is similar to that of the previous section. Nevertheless, we have to make
some substantial changes. In particular, we use an indicator function max{0, 1−∏Nn |t−n|}
which for n ∈ [1, 2, 3, ...47] denotes the possible intermediate payout periods. The indicator
function is 1 if there is a payout and 0 if there is no payout. Furthermore, we need to take
into account that the unemployment accounts at n+1 (i.e. one period after the payout ) are
down to zero for the unemployed, and tAt wn for the employed. The new objective problem
of the individual can be expressed by:
Vt(Xt, At, St, t) = max
c
St
t ,l
St
t
E
{
T∑
t
βt−1uSt(cStt , l
St
t ) + β
T+1Ω(XT+1, AT+1)
}
(3.10)
Xt+1 =

(1 + r)Xt + wt(1− τAt ) +At ·max{0, 1−
∏N
n |t− n|} − cEt
for St = E and n ∈ [1, 2, 3, ...47]
(1 + r)Xt + bt − cUt + max{0, At − bt}max{0, 1−
∏N
n |t− n|}
for St = U and n ∈ [1, 2, 3, ...47]
At+1 =

(1 + r)At · (1−max{0, 1−
∏N
n |t− n|}) + wtτAt
for St = E and n ∈ [1, 2, 3, ...47]
max{0, (1 + r)At − bt} · (1−max{0, 1−
∏N
n |t− n|})
for St = U and n ∈ [1, 2, 3, ...47]
St+1 = Πt(St, l
St
t )
Πt =
 piEE(lEt ) piEU (lEt )
piUE(l
U
t ) piUU (l
U
t )

Xt, At ≥ 0 cStt ≥ 0 0 ≤ lStt ≤ 1
In contrast to the baseline case, our second case features one additional payout at age 37
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(i.e. n = 20) and in the third case there will be four additional payouts at age 27, 37, 47,
57. In the following we discuss the impact of additional payouts on the development of the
account level of an individual who is always employed. The left part of Figure 3.12 depicts
how the account balance develops over the lifetime of the individual in the three scenarios.
The solid line depicts the account level with one payout upon retirement. As discussed in
the previous section the account level of the employed rises with age due to the continuing
payment to the account and due to interest. In case 2 (with one additional payout at age
37) the account balance follows the same pattern until age 37, after which it drops to zero
due to the payout. Thereafter the account balance rises again.
Recall from the previous section that the maximum payout is about twice the last
period’s wage, in the case with only one single payout occurring upon retirement. Here,
in the case with one additional payout at age 37, the individual who has always been
employed can still expect a final payout upon retirement that equals slightly more than the
last period’s wage.
Note, that at age 37 the individual, who has always been employed, has not even accu-
mulated enough on his account to finance one period of unemployment. At each age up to
37 the account balance is always lower than the corresponding benefit level. We saw that
in the case of only one payout (upon retirement) the employed would be able to finance an
unemployment benefit only at age 42. Now, the individual will only be able to finance an
unemployment benefit from his account at about age 56. The account balance in case 3
(with 5 payouts) exhibits a similar pattern as case 2. The account balance of the employed
rises after each drop. However, in this case the individual will always be able to finance
only a share of an unemployment benefit.
Next, we move from the maximum UA level to the that of the average individual. More
precisely, the right hand plot in Figure 3.12 depicts the dynamic pattern of the average
UA level as a share of the maximum UA level. Here again we have performed 100.000
simulations so that the average statistic can also be regarded as the expected path16. When
there is only one payout upon retirement (depicted by the solid line), the individual can
expect on average to receive a payout of 20% of the maximum possible payout. In contrast,
16The highest shares in the right hand plot are slightly higher than 90% which reflects the unemployment
rates of this particular age group.
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Figure 3.12: Left: Maximum Possible UA Level under Three Different UA Regimes. Right:
Average UA Level as Share of the Maximum Possible UA Level.
an individual who also receives a payout at age 37 can anticipate this early payout to be
about 53% of the maximum possible payout. At age 65 this share will still be more than
32%, thus much higher than in the case of only one payout 17. With four additional payout
periods the average payout is each time roughly about 70% of the maximum possible payout.
Note, that also the final payout has increased to 70%. The reason for this difference clearly
seems to be that a shortened waiting time for the payout reduces the variance of payouts.
However, the additional payouts might as well have a significant impact on labor market
incentives. In order to shed more light on the dynamic decision-making process of the
individual in face of these additional payout periods, we again consider in the following an
individual who is always employed. Figure 3.13 depicts his decisions with regard to leisure
and consumption, as well as the asset and account levels. Please note, that the upper two
graphs show the asset and account levels until age 65, while the lower two graphs depict
the consumption and leisure choice up to the last relevant decision period, which is age 64.
The most interesting fact to note, is that the individual reacts to the additional payouts
well in advance and adjusts his behavior accordingly. The upper left graph shows the asset
level. At age 37, when the individual receives the payout from his account there is an
obvious jump in his asset level. However, the asset line diverges, from the one with only
17Obviously, the nominal payout is lower.
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one single payout upon retirement, well before age 37. The asset level of the individual
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
0
2
4
6
8
age
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
0
2
4
6
8
10
age
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
1
2
3
4
5
age
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
0.15
0.16
0.17
0.18
0.19
age
Consumption Leisure
UA LevelAsset Level
      Payout at age 65 Payout at age 37 and 65 Payout at age 27, 37, 47, 57 and 65
Figure 3.13: Always Employed Individuals under the UI and the UA Systems (1, 2 or 5
Payout Periods) (The horizontal axis denotes age)
starts to accumulate faster roughly six years before. Overall, introducing an additional
payout period at age 37 increases savings throughout his working life. While decreased
consumption explains the increase in savings up to age 37, consumption rises thereafter as
well. From the payout period onwards, the individual enjoys more consumption throughout
his working life, than someone who receives only one single payout upon retirement. The
reason is, that an individual, who anticipates a payout at the age 37, adjusts his leisure
choice right from the beginning of his working life. The lower right graph shows that the
leisure choice is much lower than a leisure choice of someone who anticipates his only payout
at age 65. Past age 31 the individual has even more labor market incentives in order to make
sure that he will accumulate a high account balance until payout time. Once he receives
the accumulated balance, his leisure level jumps upwards. In the next ten years, his leisure
level remains above the leisure of an individual in the single payout case at a diminishing
rate. Eventually around age 52 it even drops below the leisure level of the single payout
case. Overall, Figure 3.13 shows that it is optimal for the individual to shift his utility over
time. He accepts less utility in the first years (with less consumption and less leisure), in
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order to trigger more utility in later years. Both, consumption and the asset level are well
above the solid line after the payout period. Higher assets serve as a mechanism to dampen
potential future shocks of unemployment. Therefore the individual is able to enjoy a rather
long period of 15 years, in which his leisure is much higher than with one single payout.
Towards the end of the working life, the level of leisure decreases in anticipation of the
second payout, which occurs upon retirement. Consumption converges to the consumption
level in the single payout case. Finally, the savings are gradually consumed towards the end
of the working life.
In case 3 (with 5 payouts) a similar pattern can be observed. Savings accumulate
stronger over the lifetime. Overall, they are continuously higher than in the previous two
cases. This might be due to the lower marginal utility of consumption due to decreasing
leisure choices. Individuals anticipate a potential payout at age 27 and therefore reduce
their consumption slightly and increase their labor market efforts significantly. The same
pattern is observed for the following payout periods. Towards the end of the working life
the individual gradually consumes his savings. The consumption choice of the individual
resembles the one in the two-payout case. It decreases in the years before the payout, and
jumps to a higher level thereafter. After the first payout it remains at a higher level than in
the two-period case. One possible explanation for this is, that it is optimal for the individual
to choose a lower leisure level than in the single payout case. After each payout the leisure
level jumps upwards, but it only overshoots the leisure choice in the single payout case after
two (out of five) payout periods. The last jump occurs at age 57 and is certainly due to
the rather high level of assets at this point. Recall that assets serve as a cushion against
potential unemployment. Therefore, the individual can afford a higher leisure choice.
Overall we observe a very significant labor market incentives effect of additional payout
periods. Take for example the additional payout at age 37 only (case 2). Such a payout
has an enormous wealth effect for the individual who is in turn willing to reduce leisure
and consumption in face of the payout period. In the following section we show how the
incentive effects of single and multiple payout periods translate into a lower unemployment
rate. Moreover, we investigate whether it is financially feasible to replace the unemployment
insurance system by individual unemployment accounts and determine its impact on welfare.
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3.5 Implications for Welfare and the Government Budget
In this study, we do not model any strategic behavior of the government. For instance,
we do not assume, that the government endogenously determines the welfare-maximizing
contribution to the UA. Instead, we are primarily interested in the effects of the UA system
on labor market incentives and aggregate welfare. Nevertheless, we aim at providing an
analysis of how the UA affects the budgetary balance of the policy maker. That analysis
should also be comparable with the current design of the unemployment insurance system.
Therefore, we use the our dynamic programming approach to shed some light on the im-
plications of the UA system on welfare. Our approach goes as follows. First, we compare
the implications of both regimes on the government budget. In the second step we compute
the consumption equivalent of entrants to the labor market, which is a valid measure of
welfare. Obviously, a system of UA, which reduces unemployment, improves welfare and
has a positive effect on government budget clearly constitutes a Pareto improvement over
the current UI system.
3.5.1 Unemployment Rate and Government Budget
Table 3.4 provides a summary of the unemployment rates and the government’s budget
positions in the different payout regimes. The interesting thing to note is, that the unem-
ployment rate is lower, the more payout options are available in the unemployment account
system. As discussed in Section 3.3.1 the unemployment rate is 18.7% lower in the unem-
ployment account system with a single payout than in the UI system. With more payout
periods included, the unemployment rate drops even further. Relative to the UI system it
can be reduced by more than 26%.
Looking at the development of the unemployment rates more closely, Figure 3.14 depicts
a clear pattern with respect to the payout periods. The unemployment rate is depicted for
the three payout regimes in the UA system over the life cycle of the individuals. Including
an additional payout at age 37 drives the unemployment rate up immediately after the
payout. This is due to the increased leisure shown in Figure 3.13. The unemployment rate
even overshoots the level of unemployment in the single payout regime, but converges slowly
thereafter. In the case with 5 payout periods, this pattern is replicated. With respect to
the government budget we assume that employers pay an additional 3% contribution to the
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Total unemployment rate Government’s Budget Position
(absolute change to UI regime) (Euros per individual, per year)
UI Regime 10.46% 0
UA Regime 8.50% +458
Payout in t ∈ {65} (-18.7%)
UA Regime 8.08% +364
Payout in t ∈ {37, 65} (-22.8%)
UA Regime 7.70% +240
Payout in t ∈ {27, 37, 47, 57, 65} (-26.4%)
Table 3.4: Unemployment Rate and Government Budget for Different Regimes
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Figure 3.14: Unemployment Rate for Three Different UA Regimes
common fund in order to achieve financial balance of the government budget. Overall, the
total unemployment contribution rate (of individuals and their employers) is slightly too
high for the prevailing unemployment rate of 10.4%. However, in our model all unemployed
individuals receive the same level of unemployment benefits. In reality, however, there is a
bias towards individuals in the lower income deciles. Among the unemployed the percentage
of low-income individuals is disproportionately high. In consequence there will be a larger
percentage of unemployment benefits that are below the average.
Figure 3.15 shows the details with respect to the government budget. In particular, we
see the changes in the government budget position (relative to the UI system) caused by
different age cohorts. In the case of one single payout at age 65, the government budget
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position starts worse off in the account system (than in the UI system), and improves with
an increasing age of the population. The reason is, that due to the low accumulated account
balances, the young generation depends on the co-financing of the unemployment benefits
by the government. As can be seen in the right part of Figure 3.15, the government’s share
of the unemployment benefit is 100% for the labor market entrants and falls to nearly 50%
on average for the old. Thus, on average, the government contributes about 2/3 of the
unemployment benefits. Comparing the UI system with the UA system, the government
receives less revenue from taxes, since the individuals pay a direct contribution to their
account instead. At the same time, only the older individuals can afford to pay the unem-
ployment benefits from their account without relying on co-financing by the government.
Consequently, when shifting from from the UI system to the UA system, the government
”looses” for the youngest third of the labor force and ”gains” from the older two-third of
the labor force. The gains from the older age cohorts are further amplified through higher
working incentives. Overall, the government budget is improved significantly when shifting
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Figure 3.15: Left: Change in the Government Budget Position under Three Different UA
Regimes. Right: Governments’ Share of Unemployment Benefits
from the UI to UA system. The government now gains 458e per year per individual, in
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contrast to the balanced budget position in the UI system. This huge improvement in the
government budget indicates the potential of lowering the distortionary tax rate. This in
turn might set in motion another round of positive labour market incentives, followed by
lower unemployment.
When we include an additional payout at age 37, the government still ’looses” for the
younger generations, but far less, than in the case of a single payout. However, this im-
provement in the budget is more than offset by the adverse impact on the budget for the
older generations. Due to lower incentives to work, the government earns less taxes than in
the single-payout UA system. Overall, the government budget in the account system with
two payouts is therefore worse than in the account system with one payout. Note, however,
that the government budget is improved compared to the situation in the UI system. The
government still gains 364e per individual per year. The positive budgetary impact even
occurs in the case when the account system features five payouts.
3.5.2 Welfare Effects: Income Distribution
We have already shown that UA systems with either no or several additional payout periods
will induce individuals to participate more actively in the labor market. As a consequence,
we have observed a much lower unemployment rate over the entire life cycle. Inevitably,
this translates to higher income prospects due to more employment periods within each
life cycle on average. In the following we want to report the distributional consequences
of our simulations for the different UA regimes. For the calculation of the total life cycle
income we consider two measures. One measure simply represents total income from labor
and unemployment benefits. The second measure also adds the various payments from the
unemployment accounts at all payout periods. In that way we can disentangle the effect of
unemployment account payouts on life-cycle income from the changes in life-cycle income
purely due to different labor market incentives. Figure 3.16 displays the lifetime income
distribution for the three different UA regimes.
The grey-shaded histograms represent the lifetime income distribution under the UI
system. The solid black histogram denotes the case without considering additional payouts
from unemployment accounts while the dashed black histogram takes these payouts into
account.
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The left plot in Figure 3.16 compares the UI regime to the standard UA system with no
additional payout periods. We first note that the plain UA system clearly shifts the mean of
the distribution to the right. This is an expected result since less individuals are unemployed.
Also, as expected, when taking into account the final payout into the calculation of life time
income, the distribution shifts out even further to the right. Furthermore, the center and
right plots show that increasing the number of payout periods has a significantly positive
effect on life-cycle income. However, this does not necessarily imply that all individuals
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System.
will perceive improved welfare. We have previously discussed that the introduction of
unemployment accounts will lead to a lower leisure choice of all individuals. This implies
that individuals will experience disutility from increased labor market participation. In fact,
it might turn out to be the case that the this disutility dominates the extra utility gained
from higher consumption. In the following we therefore study the welfare implications of
unemployment accounts by studying consumption equivalents.
3.5.3 Welfare Effects: Consumption Equivalent
Recall from the previous section, that at age 64 the value function of an individual with
employment status i is obtained by maximizing the sum of age 64 utility and the discounted,
84
expected utility at age 65. This is given by
V i64 = max
ci64l
i
64
ui(ci64, l
i
64) (3.11)
+ β · (piii(li64) · Ωi(X65, A65) + piij(ljt ) · Ωj(X65, A65))
s.t. ci64 ≥ 0
0 ≤ li64 ≤ 1
Given that the value function at age 65 is the terminal value function, which we assume to be
represented by Ω(X65, A65) =
((1+r)(X65+A65))
α(1−γ)
1−γ . Note, that we set C65 = (X65, A65), as-
suming that all assets and account holdings are consumed upon requirement. Consequently,
a consumption equivalence representation of the age 64 value function, ceteris paribus can
be written as:
V i64 CE = u
i((1 + CE)ci64, l
i
64) + β · Ω((1 + CE)(X65, A65)) (3.12)
where we assume V i65(X
i
65, A
i
65) = V
j
65(X
j
65, A
j
65) Furthermore, we assume that consumption
and leisure choices are optimal. Following this notation, we can write the recursive formula
for the consumption equivalence adjusted value function of an individual with employment
status i as
V it CE = u
i((1 + CE)cit, l
i
t) (3.13)
+ β · (piii(lit) · ui((1 + CEi)cit+1, lit+1) + piij(lit) · uj((1 + CEi)cjt+1, ljt+1))
Next, we assume that the utiity function is multiplicative in its arguments, allowing us to
write u(c, l) = v(c)w(l). We also assume, that v(c) is homogenous of degree λ. With these
assumptions, we can rewrite the recursive formulation of the value function as:
V it CE = (1 + CE
i)λ · ui(cit, lit) + β ·
(
piii(l
i
t) · ui(cit+1, lit+1) + piij(lit) · uj(cjt+1, ljt+1)
)
= (1 + CEi)λ · V it (3.14)
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Since we are interested in the consumption equivalent adjustment of moving from the UI
system to the UA system, we can formulate the relationship for a labor market entrant as
V i18 UA = (1+CE
i)λ ·V i18 UI, which we can solve for the consumption equivalent measure.
The latter is given by
CEi =
(
V i18 UA
V i18 UI
) 1
λ
− 1 (3.15)
With this formula above we are able to study what constant and perpetual additional share
(CE) in consumption would equalize welfare under both unemployment systems. Note, that
this formula holds for both, the employed entrants as well as the unemployed ones. Also,
note that since wealth (X) is a state variable in the value function, we can represent the
consumption equivalent also as a function of the wealth level of the labor market entrant.
Finally, our CE calculations take into account the varying optimal leisure choices. We have
shown in our discussion above that the UA system will induce the individuals to reduce
their leisure choice and thus strenghten labor market incentives. This is an important
fact to consider for any welfare analysis, since higher labor market incentives are a cost in
the model and the utility from consumption needs to be sufficiently large relative to the
disutility of reduced leisure for welfare to have gone up. Table 3.5 summarizes our results
for the consumption equivalent for both, our basic version of the UA system, and also
for the additional variants of the UA system with multiple payout periods. In general,
Employment Status: unemployed employed
Wealth Level: poor average rich poor average rich
Consumption Equivalence (in %)
0.96 0.92 0.88 0.97 0.93 0.89Payout in t ∈ {65}
Consumption Equivalence (in %)
0.93 0.81 0.68 0.96 0.84 0.70Payout in t ∈ {37, 65}
Consumption Equivalence (in %)
0.85 0.62 0.34 0.89 0.65 0.38Payout in t ∈ {27, 37, 47, 57, 65}
Table 3.5: Consumption Equivalence (CE) for a Labor Market Entrant (18-Years Old). CE
Defined as Constant Percentage Increase in Consumption over the Life Cycle
Table 3.5 shows that giving individuals a perpetual increase of nearly 1% in consumption
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would equalize the welfare under both unemployment systems. However, distinguishing the
different groups of individuals and different types of account systems, we see clear differences
in the consumption equivalents. The welfare gain (CE) for an employed labour market
entrant is always a bit higher than for the unemployed labour market entrant, independent
of his asset level. The reason is, that his individual account will already start to accumulate
in the next period, in contrast to the account of the unemployed. Moreover, the persistence
effect of unemployment reduces the prospects of payouts even further. This effect is stronger
when the waiting time for payouts is reduced since the employment status of an entrant
weighs in more: The shorter the waiting time for payouts, the more likely is the receipt
of the payout, and the larger is the welfare gain of being in the unemployment account
system. However, overall the effect of employment status of an entrant on the consumption
equivalent is very low, reflecting the potential reward that an unemployed labor market
entrant may still earn.
Regarding the heterogeneity in asset levels, Table 3.5 shows that poor individuals ex-
perience a larger welfare gain in the unemployment account system than rich individuals.
This is an intuitive result since the same expected payout upon retirement has a much
stronger weight for the poor individuals. At the same time, as already explained by Table
3.3, wealthier individuals reduce leisure more strongly than poorer individuals leading to
higher disutility. This effect partially offsets the overall welfare increase of the UA system.
When increasing the number of payout periods, our results show that the welfare gains drop
significantly. This effect is particularly pronounced for wealthy individuals. The reason is,
that asset holdings tend to dampen the consumption pattern volatility occurring due to
changes in the employment status. A wealthier labor market entrant therefore has a higher
ability to smooth consumption in the stochastic labor market irrespective of the type of un-
employment system. Furthermore, note that the CE difference between the poor and rich
individuals becomes more pronounced when there are more payout periods. Recall, that
with additional payout periods, optimal leisure choices are much lower. This has, as already
explained, a negative partial effect on welfare. However, total CE still remains positive.
Thus, upon entering the labor market all individuals, whether initially employed or
unemployed, rich or poor can expect higher total welfare under any UA regime compared
to the traditional UI regime.
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3.6 Conclusion
We have studied the effects of introducing unemployment accounts within a stochastic life-
cycle framework. Individual unemployment accounts let individuals internalize the cost
of their unemployment, while at the same time enabling them to receive a considerable
payout at the end of their working life. We find that this induces the individuals to adjust
their behavior considerably. Labour market incentives are strengthened, and the average
unemployment rate is thereby reduced for all age groups. Even individuals with zero account
balances reduce their leisure choice considerably. Moreover, this result is also independent
of asset wealth. Our analysis of the individual behavior also shows, that the expectation of
a positive unemployment account payout upon retirement lowers the pressure for building
up a large stock of assets. Therefore, a crowding out of savings occurs. At the same time,
individuals choose less leisure to increase their chances of eventually receiving a positive
payout upon retirement. This lowers the aggregate rate of unemployment and translates to
an average individual who experiences a higher total level of assets (and consumption).
Strengthened labour market incentives hold particularly for the older individuals, who
are particularly sensitive to the expected payout upon retirement. In order to stimulate
the labour market incentives of the younger individuals we have introduced multiple payout
regimes, in which individuals can receive their account balance at an earlier time during
their working life. Overall, we observe a very significant labor market incentives effect of
additional payout periods. The individuals anticipate additional payouts well in advance and
adjust their behavior accordingly. Financially, the government budget improves with single
and with multiple payout periods. Compared with the situation under the UI system, the
government ”looses” for the youngest third of the labor force and ”gains” from the older two-
third of the labor force. The gains from the older age cohorts are further amplified through
higher working incentives. Overall, a reform that replaces the unemployment insurance
system with individual unemployment accounts is financially feasible. Finally, our welfare
analysis suggests that upon entering the labor market all individuals, whether initially
employed or unemployed, rich or poor, can expect higher total welfare under any UA regime
compared to the traditional UI regime.
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Chapter 4
The Transition from the Unemployment
Insurance System to the Unemployment
Accounts System
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we have shown, that the account system clearly generates higher
working incentives for individuals of all ages and irrespective of their employment status.
This in turn, also reduces the overall unemployment rate and consequently improves the
government budget compared to the UI system. We have therefore concluded, that it is
financially feasible (and desirable) to replace the traditional UI system with the UA system.
Our analysis has so far compared the UI system to the long-run state of the UA system. Once
the UA system is well-established (e.g. after 47 years), all individuals in the economy start
contributing to their individual unemployment accounts in the first year of their working
life.
However, from this previous discussion it remains unclear how the economy behaves
during the years of the transition. Is the switch from the traditional UI system to the UA
system financially feasible or how much does the switch cost and when do the long-run
positive working incentives set in?
We know from the previous chapter that the unemployment account system is mainly
driven by the incentives of the older individuals. This is because they are closest to their
payout period. During the transition, however, the accumulated account balance at the
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end of the working life will be much lower for the older individuals, as they have mainly
lived and worked under the UI system. Therefore, one might expect that their incentives
to remain employed (in order to secure their accumulated account balance) are significantly
lower than in the well-established UA system. Therefore, we investigate in detail how
the employment incentives of different age cohorts are affected throughout the transition
period. Moreover, immediately upon introduction of the UA system, the revenues of the
government are substantially reduced, as a fair share of the tax revenues is now reallocated
to the individuals’ accounts. At the same time, the positive long-run effects of the account
system might not yet have been materialized.
In this chapter, we revisit the analysis of labor market incentives under the UA system
but at the same time we investigate - from a government’s point of view - the financial
feasibility of the UA system putting a strong focus on the financial dynamics in the tran-
sition period. Our goal is to assert whether enough employment incentives are generated
during the transition such that switching from the insurance to the account system is fi-
nancially feasible. Finally, we analyze how the altered incentives to work translate into the
unemployment rate during the transition period.
The UI system which we have considered in Chapter 3 and which we also consider here
has been modeled as a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system. We assume that the government
adjusts the unemployment insurance tax in order to finance the unemployment benefits,
which is how the current unemployment system in Germany is organized. The inherent risk
pooling in the PAYG system extends over generations. For easier comparison, in particular
during the transition period, we keep this PAYG structure and apply it to the unemployment
account system. This does not imply, that we regard one or the other system as superior,
but we rather aim to make the incentive effects in the account system easier tractable1.
In principle, an unemployment account system could also be run as a fully-funded system
system (Orszag and Snower (2002)). In a fully-funded system the account balance is invested
and earns interest. The cross-subsidization is limited to each age cohort and does not
1The risk pooling over generations is one major criticism of the current system as demographic factors, such
as the advancing aging of the population put pressure on the pay-as-you-go system. In principle therefore
replacing the traditional UI system could be the right moment to consider replacing the pay-as-you-go
system with a fully-funded account system.
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extend across generations. In consequence, this necessitates a higher contribution rate than
an individual account system that incorporates a cross-generational redistributive element
(Robalino et al. (2009)). In a PAYG system, on the other hand, the accounts are so-called
notional accounts and the contributions are not invested. However, as mentioned by Brown
et al. (2007) and Robalino et al. (2009) contributions to the individual accounts may be
borrowed by the government at interest in order to finance the unemployment benefits, thus
creating more financial flexibility for the governement.
The amount of money, which is needed to finance unemployment benefits under an un-
employment account system, is less than under the unemployment insurance system. We
saw in Chapter 3 that, assuming the same unemployment insurance contributions and ben-
efits as under the UI system, the account system generates a surplus for the government
budget. With the PAYG system, we therefore seek a new unemployment account contri-
bution rate, which balances the government budget. In the first part of this chapter, we
refine our stochastic life-cycle optimization model by incorporating a PAYG system. Our
resulting long-run unemployment contribution rate is 1.565% and therefore lower than the
insurance tax under the UI system. Applying this lower contribution rate, the individuals
consequently experience what we call the wealth effect, as their disposable income rises. In
our analysis, we distinguish the pure incentive effect (which results exclusively from the
expectation of the potential payout) from this wealth effect and find that the incentive ef-
fect clearly dominates the wealth effect for all individuals, irrespective of age and wealth
status. This implies that the main driver of the account system are the changed leisure
choices due to the expected payout upon retirement. The reduced contribution rate, which
results from the larger tax base that needs to finance fewer unemployment benefits, plays
only a minor role. Taking into account the heterogeneity with respect to age and the wealth
status, we further find, that although most individuals reduce their leisure as a result of the
wealth effect, some individuals in fact raise their optimal leisure level. This has implications
for the aggregate unemployment rate, which in turn even rises for the older age cohorts
when compared to Chapter 3. Moreover, we find that when compared to the UI system the
long-run UA system improves welfare on the aggregate. However, this is not the case for
all individuals, as in particular the old rich unemployed individuals may loose welfare (in
terms of consumption equivalents) when switching from the UI to the long-run UA system.
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The results of the first part of this chapter refer to a situation in which the UA system
has been in place for a long time. Thus, they compare individuals’ behavior in a long-run
UA system (in which no individuals in the economy have ever experienced the UI system)
to the UI system. Therefore, we use the second part of this chapter to investigate the
transition to a system of unemployment accounts.
In modeling the switch from the traditional unemployment insurance system to the
unemployment account system, we have to make certain assumptions on how this transition
proceeds. The main question is who will switch to the new account system. Is the new
system mandatory for everyone, is it voluntary or is it introduced at a different speed
for different age groups? In this respect ’real-world’ experience, such as the introduction
of the accounts program in Chile, does not provide enough guidelines on how to set up
the economic model for Germany, as the system of traditional unemployment insurance
was basically non-existent before the unemployment account reform (Reyes Hartley et al.
(2011)). In their economic model Pallage and Zimmermann (2011) discuss the willingness
to shift from an insurance to a new account system and find that in an economy with a low
extent of moral hazard, the individuals prefer the UA system over the UI system 2. In our
model set-up we accordingly assume that everyone switches to the account system at the
same conditions regardless of the age or other personal characteristics. This means that also
the older individuals, who have a much shorter time horizon to accumulate large balances
on their accounts, face the same contribution rates as young individuals. The assumption
of an immediate switch enables us to decipher the exact impact of the transition on each
age cohort.
We find, that in order to achieve a fully-balanced budget in the first year of the transition,
the government needs to raise the optimal contribution rate to such a level, that it (together
with the amount paid to the common fund) exceeds the 4% unemployment insurance tax
which prevails under the UI system. However, even despite this initially high contribution
rate, the UA system generates enough working incentives in the transition period, such that
the government can afford to lower the contribution rate in each following year. Already in
year 5 of the transition, the contribution rate (together with the contribution rate to the
2This result is further amplified when the extent of moral hazard rises.
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common fund) is lower than the traditional unemployment insurance tax. Surprisingly, the
incentives to work converge very quickly to their high long-run level. The leisure choice
of all age groups drops significantly after the introduction of the accounts, with the old
individuals having the largest increase in labor market incentives.
At the same time, we also perform a transitional welfare analysis distinguishing between
the individuals’ heterogenous characteristics. We infer that during the transition period the
consumption equivalent is significantly positive for the vast majority of individuals. We
conclude that overall, the UA system - at any stage of implementation - is associated with
remarkable welfare implications.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the optimization problem,
which determines the optimal long-run tax rate in the UA system and discusses the long-
run wealth effect. Section 4.3 outlines our approach to modeling the transition period. It
describes the extended optimization problem, which determines the optimal tax rate in the
transition period and subsequently discusses the results on incentives to work and welfare
during the transition. Section 4.4 concludes.
4.2 Incentive Effects in the Long Run
In the previous chapter, we set our major focus on the incentives that arise entirely from
the introduction of individual unemployment accounts and the resulting potential payouts.
We observed significantly strong effects on the labor market incentives. For simplicity we
assumed, that the after-tax income of each individual is the same under both, the UA
and the UI system. In practice however, this will not necessarily be the case. Under the
current pay-as-you-go (PAYG) funding system in Germany, the unemployment insurance
contributions by the employee as well as the employer are endogenously determined, taking
into account the bill of the total unemployment benefits in a given year. Thus, obviously a
system of unemployment accounts, which affects the unemployment rate via altering labor
market incentives, would necessarily induce an adjustment in the tax rate, which would
then eventually change the after-tax income of the individuals. Depending on the sign
of the tax adjustment, this process could either reinforce additional incentives or lead to
effects which reduce them. Our results in Chapter 3 suggest, that the equilibrating tax
under the UA system will be lower than under the UI system. In this section we want to
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revisit the optimization problem of the individual with the extension of a social planner
seeking for the optimal PAYG tax rate. In a first step, we analyze an economy with a
running UA system (long-run UA system) and compare the necessary tax adjustment to
the unemployment insurance tax. Thereafter, we show how the optimally adjusted tax
evolves in the transition period between those two systems.
4.2.1 Structure of the Long-Run Model
We now reformulate the adjusted optimization model. This time the social planner in a
PAYG system, who has full information about the individuals’ preferences and characteris-
tics is optimally setting the unemployment insurance tax, such as to equilibrate total unem-
ployment insurance contributions and total unemployment benefits in each given period. For
clarification, recall that τAt denotes the unemployment account contribution of the individual
under the UA system. Let τ It denote the unemployment insurance contribution, which each
employed individual is paying to the common unemployment fund. Consequently, the total
contribution of the individual (employee) is τ employeet = τ
A
t + τ
I
t
3. Similarly, let τ employert
denote the employer’s contribution to the common fund. For the UI system, we have set
the ratio of τ employert to τ
employee
t as constant
4 and obtained τ employeet = 4%. For the UA
system analysis in Chapter 3, we assumed that τAt = τ
I
t = 2% and τ
employer
t = 3% in order
to apply the same parameter values as in the financially balanced UI system. The focus
of the following analysis is the re-optimization of the contribution rate to the unemploy-
ment account. The government commits to a PAYG financing system with unemployment
accounts and sets the optimal employer’s tax, τ employert , the optimal contribution rate to
the account of the employee, τAt , and the optimal unemployment insurance contribution
to the common fund (paid by the employee), τ It , taking into account the individuals’ wel-
fare maximization problem. For simplicity, we assume that τAt = τ
I
t , so that by using the
above mentioned constraints the objective eventually becomes to determine the optimal
unemployment account contribution τAt .
We decompose the problem into an outer and inner optimization problem. The outer
3Obviously, under the UI system τAt = 0. Note, that in the government budget analysis in Chapter 3 we
assumed that τAt = 2% and that τ
I
t = 2% in the UA system and τ
employee
t = 4% in the UI system
4which is a reasonable assumption for the German UI system in the investigated time period.
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optimization problem refers to finding the optimal tax rate (or the optimal contribution rate
to the account in the case of the UA system), which balances total tax receipts and total
benefits. The inner optimization problem constitutes the individuals’ welfare maximization
problem.
Outer optimization problem under the UA system: Let N denote the size of the
working-age population in the economy at any period, with N = NE + NU , where NE
and NU denote the total number of employed and unemployed individuals in that period.
The total amount of unemployment contributions received by the government from worker
i’s labor contract is given by witτ
A(1 + 2/σ), where σ denotes the constant share between
the employer’s and employee’s contributions. Similarly, the amount of benefits which the
government provides for each unemployed i is given by max{bit− (1 + r)Ait, 0}. Considering
the entire working-age population, the government seeks the level of τAt which solves the
following equation:
0 =
NE∑
i=1
witτ
A(1 + 2/σ)−
NU∑
i=1
max{bit − (1 + r)Ait, 0} (4.1)
Note, that by increasing N , the number of simulated individuals, τA converges to the true
optimum level, and for N being sufficiently large (we choose N=100,000) the approximation
will be accurate.
Inner optimization problem under the UA system: The N individuals, of age t
are endowed with asset holdings Xt and unemployment account balance At. Given the
employment status St, each individual chooses consumption c and leisure l to maximize the
expected present discounted life-time utility stream up to t = T . Utility in state S is given
by USt(cStt , l
St
t ) We specify t ∈ [18, 19, 20, . . . 64] as the age of an individual participating
in the labor market, where age 65 corresponds to the retirement period. Thus, we have 47
periods with annual time steps. The objective function of the individuals can be expressed
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by:
Vt(Xt, At, St, t) = max
c
St
t ,l
St
t
E
{
T∑
t
βt−1uSt(cStt , l
St
t ) + β
T+1Ω(XT+1, AT+1)
}
s.t. Xt+1 =

(1 + r)Xt + wt(1− τA)− cEt for St = E
(1 + r)Xt + bt − cUt for St = U
At+1 =

(1 + r)At + wtτ
A for St = E
max{0, (1 + r)At − bt} for St = U
St+1 = Πt(St, l
St
t )
Πt =
 piEE(lEt ) piEU (lEt )
piUE(l
U
t ) piUU (l
U
t )

Xt, At ≥ 0 cStt ≥ 0 0 ≤ lStt ≤ 1 (4.2)
By analogy, the government’s optimization problem under the UI system is a reduced ver-
sion of the one under the UA system. It can be expressed by eliminating the unemployment
account state variable At and replacing the unemployment account contribution τ
A
t by the
contribution to the unemployment insurance.
Outer optimization problem under the UI system: Let N denote the size of working
age population in the economy at any period, with N = NE + NU , where NE and NU
denote the total number of employed and unemployed individuals in that period. The total
amount of unemployment insurance contributions received by the government from worker’s
i labor contract is given by witτ
I(1+1/σ), where σ again denotes the constant share between
the employer’s and employee’s contributions. Similarly, the amount of benefits which the
government provides for each unemployed individual i is given by bit. Considering the entire
working-age population, the government seeks the level of τ It which solves the following
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equation:
0 =
NE∑
i=1
witτ
I(1 + 1/σ)−
NU∑
i=1
bit (4.3)
Inner optimization problem under UI system: The N individuals, of age t are en-
dowed with asset holdings Xt. Given the employment status St, the individuals each choose
consumption c and leisure l to maximize the expected present discounted life-time utility
stream up to t = T . Utility in state S is given by USt(cStt , l
St
t ) We specify t ∈ [18, 19, 20,
. . . 64] as the age of an individual participating in the labor market, where age 65 corre-
sponds to the retirement period. Thus, we have 47 with annual time steps. The objective
function of an individual can be expressed by:
Vt(Xt, St, t) = max
c
St
t ,l
St
t
E
{
T∑
t
βt−1uSt(cStt , l
St
t ) + β
T+1Ω(XT+1)
}
s.t. Xt+1 =

(1 + r)Xt + wt(1− τ I)− cEt for St = E
(1 + r)Xt + bt − cUt for St = U
St+1 = Πt(St, l
St
t )
Πt =
 piEE(lEt ) piEU (lEt )
piUE(l
U
t ) piUU (l
U
t )

Xt ≥ 0 cStt ≥ 0 0 ≤ lStt ≤ 1 (4.4)
While the inner maximization problem under both, UA and UI systems is done by dynamic
programming with value function iteration as explained in Chapter 3, the outer optimization
problem can be done by a simple root-finding procedure. However, since we assume a
monotonic relationship between the optimal tax level and the budgetary position, the outer
optimization problem can also be solved by a simple guess and verify procedure, checking
a finite set of possible levels.
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In order to achieve a balanced budget in the UI system we assumed an insurance tax rate
of τ I=4% (to be paid by the employee) and τ employer = 3.05%. Applying the same values to
the UA system (with a contribution rate to the account, τA, of 2%, and 2% for the common
fund), the government experiences an improvement in the budget. Recall, that with one
single payout upon retirement, the UA system will generate 458e per individual per year,
as described in Chapter 3 in Table 3.14. Using the new optimization problem the long-run
UA system is financially balanced with a τA=1.565%, τ I=1.565% and τ employer = 2.387%.
Thus, as expected the optimal long-run contribution of the employees to the account system
is substantially lower. Furthermore, note that since the employer’s contribution is reduced,
the demand side of labor is positively affected and more jobs might be created.
4.2.2 Disentangling Long-Run Effects
We have already seen that the UA system generally induces changes in workers’ labor market
incentives. Chapter 3 demonstrated that these incentives are improved for all individuals in
the long run. In the previous section, we discussed that the lower long run unemployment
rate will bring about a significant reduction in the tax rate on labor. Most likely, individuals
will also react to that as well. In the following we would like to investigate the impacts of this
second-order effect on labor market incentives. It helps to define two different mechanisms
by which the optimal leisure choice is affected. One is what we call the pure incentive effect
and refers to the direct impact from the unemployment accounts. The individuals pay a
contribution rate into their individual accounts, and accordingly alter their leisure choices
as they expect a certain future payout. (This effect has been discussed at length in the
previous chapter). The second mechanism describes the impact arising from the so-called
wealth effect. As described in Chapter 3 the government would actually make a surplus in
the unemployment account system, if it were to keep the same insurance taxes. The reason
for this was the reduced leisure choice, which resulted in higher hiring and lower firing
rates. Consequently, fewer individuals were unemployed and at the same time, the tax base
increased due to more employed individuals. As a result a reduction in the overall tax
rate would be possible in order to keep the government budget financially balanced. This
reduction in the tax rate lowers the overall contribution rate, leading to a higher disposable
income for the individuals. This wealth effect will consequently affect their leisure choices
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further. In principle, its direction is ambiguous. On the one hand, a lower overall tax rate
stimulates even higher working incentives of the individuals, as the opportunity cost of the
status of employment rise and working becomes more profitable. On the other hand, higher
disposable income may induce individuals to raise their leisure choices, as the increased
disposable income enables them to enjoy a higher leisure level while affording the same
consumption level.
In the following we decompose the change in leisure in its two components; the wealth
effect (due to the higher disposable income) and the pure incentive effect (due to the ex-
pected payout upon retirement). We investigate in detail if these effects work against each
other or complement each other, both in the long-run, as well as in the transition period
which we discuss in later sections.
Figure 4.1 disentangles the pure incentive effect from the wealth effect with respect
to leisure for the employed as well as for the unemployed individual. It shows that the
reduction in leisure that occurs in the long-run UA system is mainly caused by the pure
incentive effect and only a small part of the overall reduction is due to the reduction of
the contribution rate (and the accordingly higher disposable income). The incentive effect
clearly dominates the wealth effect irrespective of the employment status. For an 18-year
old individual it is around 70% of the overall effect, and rises with increasing age up to 100%
for the very old. Obviously, with increasing age, the wealth effect becomes less prevailing
since individuals accumulate assets over their lifetime and older individuals therefore rather
prefer to use the additional disposable income for consumption.
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Figure 4.1: Share of Pure Incentive Effect of Total Long-Run Effect
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We take a more detailed look at the reduction in leisure in Table 4.1. It decomposes the
incentive and wealth effect taking into account the heterogeneity of the individuals with
respect to age, the employment status, wealth status and the account balance. Table 4.1
shows the overall optimal reduction in leisure, which is associated with the long-run UA
system (compared to the UI system). The numbers in brackets show the reduction in leisure,
which results purely from the incentive effect.
One result that immediately becomes obvious, is that the incentive effect dominates the
wealth effect for all groups of individuals. The wealth effect is strongest for the youngest age
cohort, but even here it reaches maximally 32% of the total effect. Overall, older individuals
reduce their leisure much stronger than younger individuals and at the same time, the share
of the incentive effect in this reduction also grows stronger with rising age. This confirms
our previously noted findings from Figure 4.1. The other main message is that there is
no clear pattern visible with respect to the wealth status, nor with respect to the level of
the unemployment account balance, or the employment status. Differentiating the leisure
Employment Status: U E
Wealth Level: poor rich poor rich
Age = 18 1.42 (1.01) 2.17(1.68) 1.27 (0.86) 1.81 (1.46)
Age = 40
5.08 (4.61) 6.13 (5.63) 4.78 (4.46) 5.05(4.72)
LowA
Age = 40
9.82 (9.28) 5.95 (5.39) 11.61(10.99) 9.30 (8.87)
HighA
Age = 62
11.03 (10.97) 14.93 (14.16) 10.62 (10.78) 12.40 (12.48)
LowA
Age = 62
21.00(20.99) 13.30 (13.22) 27.11 (27.02) 20.92 (21.05)
HighA
Table 4.1: Reduction in Leisure Choice in %. Number in Brackets: % Reduction in Leisure
- Incentive Effect
reduction with respect to heterogenous individuals nevertheless exposes three interesting
cases. In Figure 4.1 we see that overall the wealth effect contributes to the reduction in
leisure, that occurs when comparing the UI system to the long-run UA system. Figure 4.1
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further shows that the incentive effect dominates both for the employed as well as for the
unemployed and that it reaches 100% for the very old. However, what is disguised in this
aggregate picture is that the additional income generated by the long-run tax reduction
induces certain groups of individuals to raise their leisure choice, instead of reducing it like
all the others. Consequently, the incentive effect is larger than the total effect for the three
individuals highlighted in the lower right corner of Table 4.1. Rich5 old employed individuals
increase their leisure choice as a response to the long-run tax reduction6. Apparently, rich
old employed individuals retrieve higher utility from additional leisure, instead of further
improving their hiring/firing probabilities by reducing leisure. This behavior is consistent
irrespective of the level of their account balances. The next interesting case concerns the
poor old employed individuals with a low balance on their individual account. These in-
dividuals do not expect a (high) payout, since they retire already 3 years later and will
not have accumulated much until then. However, the additional increase in leisure appears
to give them a utility boost, which is superior to the additional money that they may (or
may not) earn by improving his employment prospects and therefore his account balance.
One would think that the poor old employed with a high balance on his individual account
behaves similarly. However, he does not increase but rather decreases his optimal leisure
choice in response to the tax cut. The reason is that, this individual wants to make sure
that he indeed receives this payout. In order to ensure this, he will take no extra risk and
reduces his leisure accordingly.
As our results show, the aggregate wealth effect is clearly positive despite the three
special cases just mentioned, so that overall the higher disposable income induces the indi-
viduals to lower their leisure choices.
In the following we discuss how the changed leisure choices induced by the lower tax rate
translate into the unemployment rate. There are two mechanisms through which the unem-
ployment rate is affected. One is that the wealth effect (generated by the lower contribution
rate) is more important for younger individuals. They react much more strongly to the
lower contribution rate. Second, while young individuals reduce their leisure in response to
5In general, we assume a poor individual to have less than half of the average individual’s assets, while we
define a rich individual to have more than twice the average amount of assets.
6Note, that overall their optimal leisure choice is reduced when comparing the UA and the UI system.
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the tax, the older individuals exhibit lower incentives to work. Consequently, the long-run
tax reduction should decrease the unemployment rate primarily for young individuals. This
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Figure 4.2: Long-Run Share of Wealth Effect as % of the Total Unemployment Reduction
when Switching from the UI to the Long-Run UA System
is exactly what we can see in Figure 4.2, which visualizes the impact of the wealth effect on
the unemployment rates of the different age cohorts.
Accordingly, we can see that the unemployment rate of the very young labour mar-
ket entrants is reduced by 25%. This falls at a diminishing rate up to age 58 at which
the unemployment rate is actually increased. Thus, for the individuals aged 58 or older
the unemployment rate rises slightly in consequence of the higher disposable income gen-
erated by the long-run tax reduction. Overall, this translates into an improved aggregate
unemployment rate of 8.35%, which compares to 10.46% in the UI system.
In the following we investigate which constant and perpetual increase in consumption
equalizes the welfare under the UI and the UA system. This takes into account that an
additional reduction in leisure (as experienced by most individuals here) is a cost in the
model and utility from consumption needs to be sufficiently large relative to the disutility
of the reduced leisure to increase welfare. More specifically, Figure 4.3 shows the details
with respect to the consumption equivalents of heterogenous individuals taking into account
the long-run effect of the tax reduction. Figure 4.3 compares the consumption equivalents
of individuals with different employment status and different wealth status 7. Moreover, it
shows the consumption equivalents pertaining to different age cohorts.
7For a detailed mathematical derivation of the consumption equivalents, please refer to Section 3.5.3
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Distinguishing the different groups of individuals, we see clear differences in the con-
sumption equivalents. One major difference refers to the wealth status. The consumption
equivalent of poor individuals is higher than the consumption equivalent of rich individu-
als. This finding holds irrespective of the employment status or the age of the individuals.
One reason why poor individuals experience a larger welfare gain in the unemployment
account system than rich individuals, is the additional income from the expected payout,
which raises their utility more than that of rich individuals, as rich individuals have a lower
marginal utility from the additional payout upon retirement. The interplay of the consump-
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Figure 4.3: CE for Different Age-Cohorts When Switching to the UA System - Left (Un-
employed) and Right (Employed), Rich and Poor Individuals
tion equivalent and the wealth status of the individuals also changes with the individuals’
age. The welfare gain of the UA system for labour market entrants is about 1.2%, and
it is basically the same for the unemployed and employed and independent of their asset
levels. For 40-year-old individuals, the consumption equivalent is still quite high: slightly
above 1% for the rich and slightly below 0.8% for the poor. One year before the retirement
period (age 64), the unemployed (rich and poor) face a consumption equivalent of 0%. This
is quite an obvious result, since those individuals are not contributing any payments to
their unemployment accounts and will receive no payout upon retirement8. In contrast,
8Recall, that we assume a zero account level in the consumption equivalent calculations.
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the employed have a positive consumption equivalent. While it is about 0.6% for the rich,
the consumption equivalent for the poor is more than twice as high, almost 1.3%. Rich
employed 64 year-old workers are facing a much lower marginal utility of additional con-
sumption upon retirement. Recall, that the major driving mechanism of the unemployment
account system is that individuals are not forced to accumulate a high stock of savings in
anticipation of the payout upon retirement. This leads them to consume higher amounts
over their lifetime, while at the same time increasing their labor efforts in order to secure
that final payout. However, if, e.g. a 50- year old poor individual is facing an empty un-
employment account balance, this individual has to sacrifice much more leisure (and most
probably) consumption to guarantee some level of consumption in the retirement period.
Next, we turn to the effect of the employment status on the consumption equivalent. It
is important to recall, that unemployed individuals receive only 60% of the regular wage,
and therefore must use their savings to sustain the usual consumption levels. Given their
depleting stock of savings, the unemployed face increasing pressure to find employment. This
feature is important in understanding Figure 4.3. In general, the consumption equivalent for
the employed is higher than for the unemployed as the associated expected account balance
is much higher. Also, for most individuals, the introduction of the UA system constituted
a positive consumption equivalent. Nevertheless, note that the consumption equivalent is
decreasing with the individuals’ age until age 58. Clearly the possible compounding of a
positive unemployment account plays a role in that. Most likely however, the decreasing
relative level of leisure under the UA system, as explained in Figure 3.4 is the major driving
force behind this development. For the employed at age 59, the consumption equivalent
seems do become dominated by the effect of employment persistence, indicating a high
probability of receiving a positive payout from the unemployment account upon retirement.
In contrast when considering the 59-63-year old rich unemployed, we see that a switch to
the UA system will have a slightly negative welfare effect. The order of magnitude is about
-0.2%. Obviously those individuals sharply reduce their leisure to find employment which
will might guarantee a positive unemployment account upon retirement. This disutility from
lower leisure seems to offset the potential welfare gains from higher consumption levels upon
retirement.
The general finding from Figure 4.3 is that the consumption equivalent is always positive,
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except for the very old rich unemployed. This implies that, with exception for the latter
group of individuals, the unemployment account system in the long-run is superior in welfare
terms to the unemployment insurance system.
4.3 The Unemployment Account System in the Transition
Period
In this section we investigate the optimal PAYG contribution rate to the account for the
transition period. Furthermore, we also look at the corresponding incentive effects in the
transition. Suppose first, that the government does not adjust the UA tax rate during
each year of the transition phase when switching from the UI to the UA system. Figure
4.4 shows the evolution of the government budget, applying three different contribution
rates, which are fixed over the entire transition period. As examples, we choose 2% (the UI
system PAYG rate), 1.565% (the long run optimal PAYG UA rate) and 2.75% (which we
later show to be the PAYG UA rate in the first period of the transition). Figure 4.4 shows
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Rates of UA Contribution
that even if the government would simply adopt the 2% contribution rate 9, the government
would only make a loss in the first 4 years of the transition period. The government budget
9This 2% contribution rate is comparable to the traditional UI system, as it implies keeping the same tax
level as in the UI system.
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balance deteriorates upon the introduction of the UA system, as individuals have not yet
accumulated much on their accounts, and therefore still rely on government support. At the
same time, the revenues of the government fall by half, as 2% are paid into the individual
account. In the following years the budget continuously improves. The UA system becomes
self-financing after 4 years, after which the government continuously earns more revenue
than it needs to finance the unemployment benefits. Furthermore, it takes about 5 additional
years for the government to cover the loss which has been accumulated in the first 4 years.
After about 20 years the full budgetary impact of the UA system has been almost reached.
The perpetual long-run gain amounts to 458e per individual per year.
In order to already achieve a financial balance in the first year of the transition, a
tax rate of 2.75% is needed as shown by the dotted line in Figure 4.4 10. Consequently,
workers experience a 1.5% reduction in disposable income, since they are obliged to pay an
equal share to the common fund in addition to their contribution to the individual account.
Applying the optimal long-run tax rate of 1.565% to the whole transition period, we see
that it takes only 23 years until the system is financially balanced.
Figure 4.4 motivates the need for determining the optimal tax rate in the transition
period through a new optimization problem. While in principle the government could use
revenues from the later years to compensate the first 4 years in which it makes a loss (in
the 2% contribution case), we illustrate in the following how the optimal tax rate needs to
adjust to achieve financial balance in each year during the transition period. This takes into
account, that individuals pay less taxes, as part of their overall contribution is now paid into
their private account. At the same time these lower tax revenues need to finance the same
level of unemployment benefits in the first years of the transition period. We ask, which
tax rate is needed in order to finance this smooth introduction of the accounts. In order
to compensate the lower revenues in the first years, the government will have to charge a
tax which is higher than the 2%. In fact, Figure 4.4 shows that the optimal tax rate in the
transition period, which balances the government budget, will decrease very rapidly from
2.75%, to 2% in the fourth year of the transition period, to the long-run tax rate of 1.565%.
In turn, we also discuss whether this initial higher tax rate (of 2.75%) may put too much
10We show in the next section how to obtain this number.
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pressure on the incentives to work and whether it is possible to achieve financial balance
under these circumstances.
4.3.1 An Extended Optimization Problem for the Transition
As in Chapter 3, we solve a stochastic life-cycle model of consumption, leisure and savings
choices with intrinsic uncertainty about the employment status of the individual. However,
this time the individuals are faced with the introduction of the UA system s years after
having entered the labor market. (where s ∈ [1, 47]). Thus, we investigate explicitly how
the economy develops in each of the 47 years of the transition. We explicitly model that the
contribution rate to the unemployment accounts now differs with the year of transition. At
the same time we assume that within each period of the transition all individuals, indepen-
dent of their age, pay the same contribution rate to their account. The latter assumption
implies that older individuals pay the same rate as younger individuals, even though they
only face the UA system for a few years and might not benefit as much from it. We assume
that there are no payouts within the life cycle. Upon retirement, all individuals receive
100% of their accumulated account balance, which is left over at the end of their working
life. Accordingly, in the first years of the transition, the final payout to old individuals upon
retirement will be low since they have spent only a few years under the UA system.
Before the government introduces the UA system, the government’s and individual’s op-
timization problem is equal to that of the UI system, as explained in the previous section.
We assume that the individuals do not anticipate the change in the government’s policy to
introduce the UA system. More specifically, since one time period in our model equals one
year, we assume that the switch to the UA system is communicated to the public in less
than a year prior to that switch. After the switch, in principle, one can use the optimization
problem of the UA system, as explained before. This time however, the expected size of the
individuals’ unemployment accounts will differ as the economy transits towards the long-
run. A 50-year-old individual one year after the switch is expected to have a much lower
level of the unemployment account compared to a 50-year-old individual e.g. 20 years after
the switch. Therefore, a government which commits to the PAYG system, must re-optimize
the tax in each period of the transition. In the following we describe the adjusted problem.
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Outer optimization problem during the transition: Let N s denote the size of the
working-age population in the economy at year s of the transition phase, with Ns =
NEs +N
U
s , where N
E
s and N
U
s denote the total number of employed and unemployed individ-
uals at period s of the transition. The total amount of unemployment insurance contribu-
tions received by the government from worker’s i labor contract is given by witτ
A
s (1 + 2/σ).
Similarly, the amount of benefits, which the government provides for each unemployed indi-
vidual i is given by max{bit− (1 + r)Ait, 0}. Considering the entire working-age population,
the government seeks the level of τAs , which solves the following equation:
0 =
NEs∑
i=1
witτ
A
s (1 + 2/σ)−
NUs∑
i=1
max{bit − (1 + r)Ait, 0} (4.5)
Inner optimization problem during the transition: The N individuals, of age t are
endowed with asset holdings Xt and unemployment account balance At. Given the employ-
ment status St, the individuals each choose consumption c and leisure l to maximize the
expected present discounted lifetime utility stream up to t = T . Utility in state S is given
by USt(cStt , l
St
t ) We specify t ∈ [18, 19, 20, . . . 64] as the age of an individual participating
in the labor market, where age 65 corresponds to the retirement period. Thus, we have 47
periods with annual time steps. The objective function of the individuals can be expressed
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by:
Vt(Xt, At, St, t) = max
c
St
t ,l
St
t
E
{
T∑
t
βt−1uSt(cStt , l
St
t ) + β
T+1Ω(XT+1, AT+1)
}
s.t. Xt+1 =

(1 + r)Xt + wt(1− τAs )− cEt for St = E
(1 + r)Xt + bt − cUt for St = U
At+1 =

(1 + r)At + wtτ
A
s for St = E
max{0, (1 + r)At − bt} for St = U
St+1 = Πt(St, l
St
t )
Πt =
 piEE(lEt ) piEU (lEt )
piUE(l
U
t ) piUU (l
U
t )

Xt, At ≥ 0 cStt ≥ 0 0 ≤ lStt ≤ 1 (4.6)
where now, τAs denotes the unemployment account contribution in year s of the transition
phase.
4.3.2 The Optimal Account Contribution Rate in the Transition
Figure 4.5 shows the optimal account contribution rate in each year of the transition pe-
riod11. As mentioned in the previous section, the optimal contribution rate, which is needed
to achieve financial balance in the first year, is about 2.75%, and therefore higher than
the long-run contribution rate. The reason is, that the government still needs to finance
the unemployment benefits as the individuals have not yet accumulated anything on their
accounts. Nevertheless, the total unemployment insurance contributions which the govern-
ment receives12 is now 6.94% instead of the 7.05% under the UI system. This implies that
11The optimal contribution rate to the unemployment accounts in the transition can be approximated
by τAs = a0 + a1s
−1 + a2s2 + a3ln(s), where a0 = 2.1312253, a1 = 0.6274944, a2 = 0.0000574 and
a3 = −0.1828895.
12As discussed earlier, this is measured as the sum of τ I and the employer’s contribution.
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already one year after the switch to the UA system, the labor market incentive effects of
the UA system are notably in place. Consequently, the overall tax is roughly 0.1 percentage
points lower.
During the transition period individuals accumulate higher unemployment account bal-
ances. This increases the share of self-financed benefits and lowers the need for government
co-financing. At the same time, the individuals reduce their leisure choices and thereby
reduce the probability of being fired. Thus, overall fewer unemployment benefits need to be
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Figure 4.5: The Optimal Account Contribution Rate During the Transition Phase
financed by a larger tax base. The optimal contribution rate to the unemployment account
decreases rapidly in the first years of the transition. After about 10 years, it continues to
decrease at a diminishing rate until approaching the long-run optimal account contribution
rate of 1.565%. Note, that after about 25 years after the switch to the UA system, the
optimal contribution rate is about 1.6%, which is almost the long-run level. The overall
contribution rate received by the government is now equal to 4.04% instead of the 7.05%
under the traditional UI system.
In the following we investigate how the incentives to work are affected throughout the
transition, and in particular how they are affected by the relatively high contribution rate in
the first year. Figure 4.6 shows the optimal leisure choices in the transition period for young,
middle-aged and old individuals differentiating further according to wealth and employment
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status13.
While the leisure choices of unemployed individuals are always higher than the optimal
leisure choices of employed individuals, the difference is much more apparent for rich in-
dividuals, who have more financial means to allow for lower working incentives. We also
see, that the optimal leisure choice falls with rising age, except for the 40 and 60 year-old
employed individuals, who choose more or less the same leisure. This is consistent with our
results from Chapter 3, which showed that individuals reduce their leisure in anticipation of
the payout. It implies that older individuals (e.g. the 60-year-old), who are much closer to
the payout period (upon retirement) than the 20-year-old, react more strongly by adjusting
their leisure choice. The transition period itself (e.g. 47 years until the long-run UA system
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Figure 4.6: Leisure in the Transition Period for Heterogenous Individuals
is reached) does not affect the working incentives much. Leisure drops most in the first
year of the transition right after the switch from the UI to the UA system. However, after
the initial drop, the optimal leisure choices approach their long-run values pretty quickly.
The initial drop is quite surprising, as the overall obligatory provisions for unemployment
13Note, that in order to facilitate comparison to the UI system, we are assuming an account level of zero.
Obviously though, a 40-year old individual is expected to have a significantly high unemployment account
balance if the UA system has already been running for 20 years.
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to be paid by the employed are higher in the first year (2.75% contribution rate to the
account in addition to the 2.75% for the common unemployment fund) than in the tradi-
tional unemployment insurance system (where the employed paid ’only’ 4% insurance tax).
Nevertheless, the individuals reduce their leisure significantly. This may be explained by
their long-run expectation on receiving a payout in the future. This prospect enhances their
working incentives from the first period onward. What further supports this explanation, is
that the drop of leisure in the first year of the transition is more extreme for the older indi-
viduals, e.g. in the most extreme case (for 60-year-old employed individuals) leisure drops
by 4 percentage points. Their waiting time until the payout is the shortest, e.g. 4 years in
contrast to 44 years waiting time of the 20-year-old. Moreover, young individuals’ employ-
ment paths risk getting heavily influenced by the persistence effect, in case they become
unemployed in the first years of their working life. Older individuals, who have only 4 more
years to go, will be less affected by this persistence. This raises their prospects compared
to the ones of young individuals. In consequence their working incentives are affected more
strongly. The main result from this discussion on optimal leisure choices is, that overall,
individuals adjust their leisure choices surprisingly fast, instead of a slow adjustment path
during the 47 years of the transition.
The same can be said about the evolvement of the aggregate unemployment rate during
the transition period, depicted in Figure 4.7. Just like the optimal leisure choices, the
unemployment rate also reaches its long-run level pretty quickly. It only takes about 2-3
years during which unemployment remains at a significantly higher level than in the long-run
UA system. Note, however, that the unemployment rate improves already in the first year
of the transition period compared to the traditional UI system. This is a remarkable result,
as it implies that on the aggregate the unemployment rate improves in all periods even with
a balanced budget assumption, and thus despite the relatively high account contribution
rate which is necessary in the first years of the transition. While overall improved working
incentives and an improved unemployment rate (under a balanced budget assumption)
are desirable from the government’s point of view, this does not necessarily hold for the
individuals themselves. As argued before, lower levels of leisure are a cost in the model
and affect the utility of individuals negatively. Overall, it is therefore uncertain whether
the welfare implications during the transition phase are positive for the individuals. In the
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Figure 4.7: Unemployment Rate in the Transition Period
following, we intent to investigate that matter.
Figure 4.8 depicts the consumption equivalents for different age cohorts taking into
account the heterogeneity of the individuals with respect to their employment status and
wealth status14. Figure 4.8 presents an upper and lower limit of the consumption equivalent.
The upper limit refers to the consumption equivalent associated with the long-run tax rate
of 1.565% (depicted by the solid line). The lower limit refers to the consumption equivalent
associated with the optimal maximal tax rate of 2.75% (depicted by the dotted line). This
is the optimal tax rate in the first year of the transition. The dashed line depicts the 2%
tax rate, which is comparable to the UI system 15. Thus, the wealth effect (the impact from
the increase in disposable income generated by the lower long-run tax rate) is visualized in
the difference between the solid and the dashed lines. Note, that while Figure 4.8 does not
depict the evolvement of the CE over the years of the transition period, it gives us a range
of possible values for the consumption equivalents, which would occur if the low, middle
and high tax case were applied to the UA system, essentially allowing us to infer the welfare
impact during the transition period.
We have already discussed the age-dependent consumption equivalent for the long-run
unemployment account contribution rate of 1.565%. Our analysis suggests that overall the
14To facilitate the comparison, the individuals depicted in Figure 4.8 all have a zero account balance.
15Actually, this tax rate is also the optimal one between the fourth and fifth year of the transition.
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Figure 4.8: CE for Different Age-Cohorts and Contributions to the UA When Switching to
the UA System
long-run UA system is clearly welfare-improving. However, upon introduction and also
during the transition the optimal account contribution rate is substantially higher. When
comparing the long-run rate to those of 2.75% and 2%, Figure 4.8 shows that the consump-
tion equivalents are highest in the long-run tax case (i.e.: τA = 1.565%). Individuals have
more disposable income available than in the other tax cases, and this translates to higher
welfare regardless of whether the individual is employed, unemployed, poor or rich. One
could think that a higher contribution rate will eventually lead to a much higher possible
level of unemployment account upon retirement, thus increasing the potential welfare gains
of the UA system. However, at the same time, the higher contribution to the unemploy-
ment account significantly lowers disposable income. While the former effect - the payout -
is uncertain, the reduction in disposable income occurs instantly, and with certainty.
We also see from Figure 4.8 that the spread of the consumption equivalents between the
upper and lower tax rate envelopes is much larger for the young age cohorts. The spread
diminishes as people get older and have higher incomes. The consumption equivalents
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basically converge for the older age cohorts. This implies, that the prevalent tax rate
makes a big difference in welfare terms for the young individuals, in contrast to the older
individuals, who experience more or less the same consumption equivalents regardless of
the underlying tax regime.
We discussed in Section 4.2 for the long-run tax case, that there is a trend for the CE
to decrease with rising age. This does not hold anymore when we consider the tax rate of
the first year (2.75%). Here, in particular visible for the poor employed, the consumption
equivalents increase with rising age. The reason is that, while young employed individuals
will tend to accumulate large balances on their individual accounts, they also experience a
loss in their disposable income due to the high contribution rate. The probability to obtain
this high payout upon retirement will vary with the employment paths during their working
lives, and is therefore highly uncertain. In contrast, the loss in disposable income due to
the high contribution rate, is certain in each year. Therefore, younger individuals tend to
experience lower welfare gains in this tax case as compared to individuals, who are older
when the UA system is introduced.
The overall message from Figure 4.8 is that the transition to the long-run UA system
is welfare improving for almost the entire working-age population. Despite a relatively
high contribution rate of 2.75%, which is needed for balanced-budget financing, the system
generates much higher welfare already in the first year of the transition by creating enough
additional utility for the individuals to compensate the loss from lower leisure levels.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we have studied the financial feasibility of the UA system by implementing
a PAYG structure. This way the government can achieve a balanced budget in the account
system by relying on cross-subsidization across generations, which is inherent in the design of
the current German unemployment insurance system. We have adjusted the optimization
problem accordingly in order to determine the optimal long-run contribution rate of the
UA system. As a result we find a long-run account contribution rate of only 1.565%,
which implies an overall burden for the employed of 3.13%. This compares to a 4% tax
burden in the traditional UI system. As a consequence, the individuals benefit from the
account system in two ways. First, they can potentially receive a large payout from their
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accumulated unemployment account upon retirement. Second, in each period during their
working life they have more disposable income available. Paying closer attention to the
heterogeneity of the individuals, we see that the individuals do not react to these different
effects in the same way. We find, that while the first effect, the incentive effect, reduces the
optimal leisure choices of all individuals, this is not the case for the latter, the wealth effect.
It induces certain groups of individuals (namely the rich old employed, and the poor old
employed with low account balances) to lower their incentives to work as a response to the
tax cut. Overall, however, the extent of the incentive effect dominates the wealth effect for
all individuals. As a result, the individuals significantly reduce their optimal leisure choices
in the long-run UA system, when compared to the UI system.
The opposed impact of the incentive and wealth effects also has implications for the
unemployment rate. Comparing it with a situation in which the budget is not balanced (but
positive), the unemployment rate now decreases for young and middle-aged age cohorts, but
increases for the older age cohorts. Comparing with the current UI system, the aggregate
unemployment rate is nevertheless reduced by roughly 2 percentage points.
Next to the positive stimulus for the supply side, the new long-run solution also turns out
to be favorable for the employer as his contributions drop to 2.387%. This may eventually
also stimulate labor demand.
Next, we have investigated how the economy behaves during the years of the transition
from the traditional UI system to the UA system. In particular, whether the switch from the
traditional UI system to the UA system is financially feasible and how employment incentives
of different age cohorts (and in turn the unemployment rate) are affected throughout the
transition period.
Our results suggest, that the switch from the UI to the UA system is self-financing and
it is possible to introduce the unemployment account system at the same conditions for
everyone without risking financial imbalance. This is an astonishing result, as the switch
(with a financially balanced budget) necessitates a high initial account contribution rate.
Although the individuals have less disposable income available in the first years, the
vast majority of the individuals experiences a positive consumption equivalent. This in-
dicates that most individuals are not only better off in the long-run UA system, but also
improve their welfare (in terms of consumption equivalents) in the transition period from
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the traditional UI system to the new account system.
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Chapter 5
General Conclusion
In this thesis we have aimed at investigating how employment incentives can be improved
by introducing a new mechanism of providing unemployment benefits. We have stressed in
particular the role of the underlying tax-transfer system in generating employment incen-
tives, while at the same time maintaining the redistributional characteristics, which transfer
income from the lifetime rich to the lifetime poor. In this respect we have focused on the
implementation and transition to an unemployment accounts system. We have been able
to show the resulting implications for individual savings, consumption and leisure choices
over the entire life cycle, as well as during the entire transition period from the current UI
system to the new long-run UA system.
We have employed a dynamic optimization model for our analysis and found that intro-
ducing individual unemployment accounts in Germany provides a very promising alternative
to the current design of unemployment benefits. Our results show that the unemployment
account system is very efficient in improving employment incentives. Both, the expectation
of receiving a payout upon retirement and lower taxes during times of employment trigger
significant changes in the individuals’ labour market behavior. (Individuals reduce their
optimal leisure choices). Overall, this leads to a much lower unemployment rate for all age
cohorts.
Due to our model design employment incentives are particularly improved for the older
age cohorts. However, we have shown that it is possible to also stimulate the employment
incentives of the young and middle-aged generations, by introducing multiple payout periods
(which occur before retirement) without generating costs that are prohibitively high.
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A further advantage of the account system is that after its implementation there is a
very rapid transition to the long-run. Individuals’ behavior, in particular their optimal
leisure choices, adjust very quickly to the new system. In turn, the account system is
also feasible from a financial perspective without straining the public budget. On the
contrary, the government budget is significantly improved. Overall, the tax burden for
the individual is significantly reduced, as individuals pay contributions to their individual
accounts. This money is not ’lost’ but can potentially be received at the end of the working
life. Furthermore, due to a reduced unemployment rate, less unemployment benefits need
to be financed overall. This in turn reduces the tax rate even further.
Our results show that the current characteristics of the German tax-benefit system
suggest that the implementation of a German unemployment account system would rest
on a solid foundation. The reason is, that in Germany the intrapersonal redistribution of
income is very high. This holds in particular for the unemployment benefits, of which more
than half are currently self-financed. Even the lowest income decile reports a remarkably
high extent of self-financing.
This is not the case for all transfers. Instead, we have seen that the intrapersonal
redistribution of income differs enormously across transfers. This points to further possible
variants of the individual accounts system, as it could be applied to other transfers, which
also feature a high extent of self-financing. Future research should focus on the feasibility
of incorporating those transfers to the individual account system. Furthermore, it may be
possible to combine certain transfers in the account system. In this particular case, old-age
pensions and unemployment benefits are already linked to some extent. Elaborating on this
further should giver more insights on such a possible combination.
With respect to the details of the unemployment account system, future research should
be directed at refining the precise characteristics of the design. One major focus should
lie on the effect of the payout period on activating employment incentives of the younger
generations. In this respect, it will be important to analyze different specifications of the
unemployment account model with multiple payouts, which vary in the amount that is paid
out, or which for instance individualize the timing of the payout period (instead of fixing
this for everyone).
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